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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES OF 
INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENT FOR  
IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
ZOË ROBINSON  
This Article addresses a fundamental and unexamined issue in the 
debate over implied constitutional rights: the effect that interpretive 
disagreement has on the development of implied rights more generally. 
Taking a comparative approach, the Article examines the implied right 
to abortion in the United States and the implied right to the freedom of 
political communication in Australia. The Article argues that despite 
the acceptance of both rights over time, the doubts concerning the 
initial recognition of the rights as well as the interrelated problems of 
judicial self-consciousness regarding the vulnerability of the implied 
right in the face of continuing controversy and the paucity of 
interpretive resources with which doctrinal developments could be 
supported, have adversely affected their development. Tracing the 
effects of disagreement on the development of two moderately secure 
implied rights across two jurisdictions, this Article ultimately 
concludes that the stunted development of implied rights in both 
jurisdictions indicates that implication is an especially weak form of 
rights protection in constitutional democracies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Among the cases involving the implication of rights from a written 
constitution, the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,
1
 
implying a right of abortion, and that of the Australian High Court in 
Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth,
2
 (―ACTV‖) 
implying a right of free communication about political matters, are among 
the best known to comparative constitutional lawyers. At the time of the 
decisions many commentators derided the courts‘ decisions as a matter of 
constitutional theory, arguing both that the courts had departed from 
proper methods of constitutional interpretation in favor of extra-
constitutional sources and other judicially created rules, and that even 
 
 
 1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973). 
 2. Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 CLR 106 (Austl.) [ACTV]. See 
also the companion case of Nationwide News Party Ltd. v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
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when the courts applied accepted methods, the application was 
inappropriate.
3
  
In the years following Roe and ACTV, it became apparent that the 
interpretive disagreement surrounding the initial implications left the 
implied rights peculiarly vulnerable to judicial revision in the short term 
and that significant modification of the initial implications had occurred 
over time. However, despite the perpetuation of this interpretive dispute, 
significant issues remain unaddressed in the implied rights debate: the 
effect that interpretive disagreement has had on the development of 
implied rights, and the impact of relying upon the implication of rights for 
fundamental rights protection in a constitutional democracy. 
The purpose of this Article is to provide a preliminary evaluation of 
these questions, and to argue that, despite the acceptance of both rights 
over time, their development has been adversely affected by the doubts 
surrounding the initial recognition of the rights, and the consequent 
interrelated problems of both judicial self-consciousness regarding the 
vulnerability of the implied right in the face of continuing controversy and 
a paucity of interpretive resources which could support doctrinal 
developments. Further, this Article addresses the broader ramifications of 
this claim, arguing that the stunted development of the implied rights 
indicates that implication is an especially weak form of rights protection. 
The approach taken is a case study examining the initial implications of 
the right to an abortion and the right of free political communication, and 
tracing the subsequent interpretive controversy and judicial development 
of the rights in the face of that controversy. This Article takes a 
comparative approach: implication of rights from a written constitution is 
not a phenomenon unique to the United States, and the interpretive debate 
has been mirrored in a number of stable constitutional democracies. 
Tracing the effects of disagreement on the development of two moderately 
secure implied rights across two jurisdictions allows conclusions to apply 
more generally and have relevance beyond the confines of U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence.
4
 
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly outlines the 
phenomenon of interpretive disagreement and why disagreement 
represents a particular problem for implied constitutional rights. Parts II 
and III discuss the Australian implied freedom of political communication, 
 
 
 3. See infra notes 38–56, and 113, 137–52 and accompanying text. 
 4. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). On the value of 
comparative studies more generally, see Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative 
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1228 (1999). 
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and the U.S. implied fundamental right of abortion respectively, 
examining the doctrinal development in the face of the interpretive 
disagreement. Part IV draws together the doctrinal consequences outlined 
in Parts II and III and provides preliminary conclusions on the broader 
impact of these consequences for rights protection more generally. 
I. INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENT AND IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Background 
Before proceeding to examine the interpretive controversy, some 
institutional background is helpful. Both the United States and Australia 
function under written constitutions designed and implemented by 
constitutional convention, the former commencing in 1789 and the latter in 
1901.
5
 The Australian Constitution was explicitly modeled on the U.S. 
Constitution, although the Australian Framers were also heavily 
influenced by English constitutionalism.
6
 Both jurisdictions have courts of 
final resort with the power of judicial review designated to hear 
constitutional matters, and claim judicial supremacy.
7
 The central 
difference between the jurisdictions is Australia's maintenance of the 
Westminster system, resulting, generally, in greater judicial deference to 
Parliament than what generally occurs in the United States.
8
 In addition, 
the Australian High Court, with one chief justice and six associate justices, 
operates under a seriatim system, whereby justices generally write separate 
opinions in each decision. The consequence of a seriatim system is that the 
 
 
 5. Albeit under markedly different circumstances. On the American constitutional founding, see 
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2005). On the Australian constitutional 
founding, see JOHN WILLIAMS, THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (2005). 
 6. See WILLIAMS, supra note 5. 
 7. Although, in neither constitution is the power of judicial review or the concept of judicial 
supremacy expressly articulated. See U.S. CONST. art. III; AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, Ch. III. The 
power was declared by Chief Justice John Marshall in the seminal U.S. case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury was cited as support for the notion of judicial review in the Australian 
context in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951), 83 CLR 1, 262 (Austl.), where 
Justice Fullagar stated ―in our system the principle of Marbury v. Madison . . . is accepted as 
axiomatic.‖ However, it should be noted that the High Court had been exercising the power of judicial 
review long before the Communist Party declaration. See generally BRIAN GALLIGAN, POLITICS OF 
THE HIGH COURT (1987) (discussing how politics may affect judicial decisions). 
 8. See, e.g., Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A 
Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience, 16 FED. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1986); Gerald 
N. Rosenberg & John M. Williams, Do Not Go Gently Into that Good Right: The First Amendment in 
the High Court of Australia, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 439, 443 (1997); L.F. CRISP, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENT 75–78 (5th ed. 1983). 
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law emanating from the decided case is not the result of a majority opinion 
but, rather, the highest common factor amongst the separate opinions.
9
 
It is universally known that the U.S. Constitution enshrines the Bill of 
Rights, expressly protecting various fundamental rights including the 
freedom of speech and association, equal protection under the law, and 
religious liberty.
10
 It is less well known that the Australian Constitution 
does not contain a bill of rights, either constitutional or statutory.
11
 The 
Australian Constitution, however, does contain some provisions that are 
often considered ―express rights,‖12 including Section 41 (right to vote), 
Section 51(xxxi) (acquisition of property to be on ―just terms‖), Section 80 
(trial by jury), Section 116 (freedom of religion), and Section 117 
(prohibition on discrimination against residents of other states).
13
  
Compared to the broad and rights-protective interpretation given to 
express constitutional rights by the U.S. Supreme Court, the interpretation 
of these civil and political rights provisions by the High Court of Australia 
has been extremely limited.
14
 A key consequence of Australia‘s 
exceptionalism with respect to an entrenched bill of rights is that the High 
Court has approached express rights provisions as limitations on 
government power, rather than as the basis for free-standing rights.
15
 
 
 
 9. See Rosenberg & Williams, supra note 8, at 449.  
 10. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 11. See generally TOM CAMPBELL ET AL., PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS: 
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA (2006) (discussing Australia‘s 
exceptionalism). 
 12. On ―express rights‖ under the Australian Constitution, see, for example, HILARY 
CHARLESWORTH, WRITING IN RIGHTS 30–31 (2002); LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 410 (4th ed. 1997); GEORGE WILLIAMS, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTION (1999); George Winterton, Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: 
Sacrificing Means to Ends?, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 121 (Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 13. Other provisions that are often considered ―express rights‖ are Section 92 (guaranteeing that 
interstate trade and commerce is ―absolutely free‖), and Section 51(xiiiA) (preventing civil 
conscription of medical practitioners). 
 14. For critiques of the express rights, see, for example, PETER BAILEY, HUMAN RIGHTS: 
AUSTRALIA IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (1990); CHARLESWORTH, supra note 12, at 30–31; 
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 245; ZINES, supra note 12, at 410. 
 15. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997), 190 CLR 1, 132 (Austl.) (Gaudron, J.); see also 
WILLIAMS, supra note 12, at 127–28; Adrienne Stone, Australia‟s Constitutional Rights and the 
Problem of Interpretive Disagreement, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 29, 32 (2005) [hereinafter Stone, 
Interpretive Disagreement]. 
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B. Defining the Interpretive Controversy 
Disagreement over the appropriate method of constitutional 
interpretation is inevitable in a modern pluralist democracy.
16
 
Disagreement is sharpened in Australia and the United States, where the 
respective written constitutions do not prescribe a method for their own 
interpretation (as is generally the case with written constitutions).
17
 
Accordingly, each is susceptible to a wide range of interpretations derived 
from a number of differing interpretive approaches.
18
 Take, for example, 
the Australian constitutional provision requiring ―just terms‖ for 
acquisitions of property. This provision specifies that: 
The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have exclusive 
power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 
the Commonwealth with respect to: . . . the acquisition of property 
on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws.
19
 
An interpretation that gives primacy to the text could require ―just terms‖ 
for all federal acquisitions, and not only real property. Conversely, a 
different interpretive approach, for example an approach that relies on the 
intentions of the constitutional drafters, might limit that requirement to 
acquisitions of land. The interpretive disagreement arises because the 
textual interpretation is not supported by the historical interpretation, and 
vice-versa.
20
  
 
 
 16. John Rawls argues that even when reasonable people debate issues such as constitutional 
interpretation in good faith, the ―burdens of judgment,‖ including the unique formative experiences of 
their individual lives, can lead them to different conclusions. As a consequence, he claims that 
―reasonable pluralism‖ is an ―inevitable outcome of free human reason‖ and a ―permanent feature of 
the public culture of democracy.‖ JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36–37, 54–57 (1993); see 
also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 12, 90–91, 263 (1999). 
 17. ―The Constitution contains no injunction as to how it is to be interpreted.‖ McGinty v. W. 
Austl. (1986), 186 CLR 140, 230 (Austl.) (McHugh, J).  
 18. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); Robert F. Nagel, 
Disagreement and Interpretation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (1993); Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Reasoning from the Top Down and from the Bottom Up: The Question of Unenumerated 
Constitutional Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 433 (1992); Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, 
at 41; David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880–85 
(1996). See generally INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 
(Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 19. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51(xxxi). 
 20. See Simon Evans, Constitutional Property Rights in Australia: Reconciling Individual Rights 
and the Common Good, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS: INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 197 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2006). 
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While interpretive disagreement is inevitable in relation to any 
constitutional provision, express or implied, it is particularly evident in the 
implication of rights from the terms of a written constitution. At the broad 
level, implied rights exclude government power from certain areas, and for 
a variety of reasons, these exclusionary implications are considered more 
controversial than, for example, merely allocating power between 
governments in a federal system. At the interpretive level, interpretations 
of a constitution are most secure when an interpretation is clearly 
supported by one or more of the established methods of constitutional 
interpretation—such as textual arguments, historical arguments, or 
precedential arguments—and is not inconsistent with any of them.21 
Although disagreement will inevitably exist about the application and 
emphasis to be given to any one of these methodologies, it is accepted that 
these traditional methodologies have some place in constitutional 
interpretation.
22
 These traditional approaches do not readily support the 
implication of rights. The problem for implied rights generally is that most 
of the methods of constitutional interpretation on which they rely are 
contested, either broadly or specifically in application; that is, there is at 
least one traditional form of constitutional argument that undermines 
them.
23
 The implied rights, then, are subject to greater degrees of 
disagreement, stemming directly from the contested nature of 
constitutional interpretation itself, resulting in their peculiar vulnerability 
and special degree of weakness. 
II. THE AUSTRALIAN IMPLIED FREEDOM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 
A. Recognizing the Implied Freedom 
The implied freedom of political communication was first recognized 
in the 1992 High Court decision ACTV
24
 and its companion case, 
Nationwide News v. Wills.
25
 However, there were two divergent 
approaches in interpretation between the justices, resulting in an implied 
right sustained by two differing foundations of the implied freedom and, 
 
 
 21. Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, at 41. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 CLR 106 (Austl.) [ACTV]. For 
a detailed outline of the case, see Dean Bell et al., Note, Implying Guarantees of Freedom into the 
Constitution: Nationwide News and Australian Capital Television, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 288 (1994). 
For scholarly reactions to the decisions see the articles contained in, Symposium, Constitutional Rights 
for Australia?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 141 (1994). 
 25. Nationwide News Party Ltd. v Wills (1992), 177 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
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necessarily, two differing conceptions of the scope of judicial review of 
legislative action.
26
 
1. A Broad Approach: The Early Majority 
A four justice majority, Chief Justice Mason, and Justices Deane, 
Toohey, and Gaudron (―the majority justices‖), held that the provisions of 
the Constitution establishing the Parliament and the Executive,
27
 as well as 
the provision enabling amendment of the Constitution by referendum,
28
 
entrenched the institutions of representative and responsible government 
in the Australian Constitution.
29
 Subsequently, the majority justices drew 
the implication that representative and responsible government required a 
level of free political communication, enforced by the judicial arm of 
government.
30
  
Under this approach, the majority justices essentially reconstructed the 
governmental relationships enshrined in the Constitution; modeled on the 
English Westminster model, the Australian Constitution was determinedly 
established to reserve protection of fundamental rights to the 
Commonwealth Parliament, with the judiciary‘s role being secondary.31 
 
 
 26. See James Stellios, Using Federalism to Protect Political Communication: Implications from 
Federal Representative Government, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. 239 (2007) [hereinafter Stellios, Using 
Federalism]. 
 27. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 7, 24. Section 7 reads: ―The Senate shall be composed of 
senators for each State, directly chosen by the people of the State, voting, until the Parliament 
otherwise provides, as one electorate.‖ AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 7. Section 24 reads: ―The House 
of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the 
Commonwealth, and the number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable, twice the number 
of senators. The number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the 
respective members of their people . . . .‖ AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 24. The provision continues 
to specify the method of selection of representatives, until Parliament provides otherwise.  
 28. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 128 (specifying that the Constitution may be amended upon 
agreement of a majority of people in the majority of states at referendum). 
 29. Nationwide News, 177 CLR at 70–73 (Deane, J., and Toohey, J.); ACTV, 177 CLR at 137 
(Mason, C.J.), 209–10 (Gaudron, J.). Note that Chief Justice Mason, with Justices Toohey, Gaudron, 
and McHugh, drew a distinction between ―representative government‖ and ―representative 
democracy.‖ ACTV, 177 CLR at 130, 199. This distinction is not important for the purposes of this 
Article. See Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and 
the Freedom of Political Communication, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 668, 672 n.17 (1999) [hereinafter 
Stone, Limits]. 
 30. Nationwide News, 177 CLR at 72 (Deane, J. and Toohey, J.); ACTV, 177 CLR at 138–40 
(Mason, C.J.), 211–12 (Gaudron, J.). 
 31. See, e.g., Brian Galligan & F.L. Morton, Australian Exceptionalism: Rights Protection 
Without a Bill of Rights, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS: INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 17 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2006); Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Introduction, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS: INSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 1 (Tom Campbell et al. eds., 2006). 
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The majority justices sought to reinterpret this arrangement, arguing that 
the federal legislative powers were never meant to encroach upon 
fundamental rights, and it was the role of the judiciary to protect those 
rights.
32
 The majority justices counseled that at Federation in 1901, 
sovereignty had shifted not from the Imperial Parliament to the 
Commonwealth Parliament but rather from the Imperial Parliament to the 
Australian people.
33
 In this view, the Commonwealth Parliament only 
holds legislative power in trust, and the judiciary‘s role is to police the 
exercise of that power; the implied freedom, then, was necessary to ensure 
the effective workings of the Australian democratic system.
34
 
2. Conservative Approach: The Early Minority 
Two justices disagreed with the interpretive approach of the majority 
justices, Justices Brennan and McHugh. Justices Brennan and McHugh 
were significantly more conservative, and less controversial, in their 
interpretative methodology in drawing implications from the Constitution. 
Although these justices also held that the Constitution impliedly limited 
government regulation of political communication, their analysis was 
directly linked to the text of the Constitution.
35
 That is, Justices Brennan 
and McHugh cut out the middle step of the majority justice‘s three-step 
implication approach: (1) the written Constitution, (2) enshrines the broad 
institutions of representative and responsible government, and (3) those 
 
 
 32. Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486 (Austl.) (Deane, J., and Toohey, J.). See 
generally Justice John Toohey, A Government of Laws, and Not of Men?, 4 PUB. L. REV. 158, 169–70 
(1993); George Winterton, Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to 
Ends?, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 121 (Charles 
Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996); Leslie Zines, Courts Unmaking the Law, in COURTS IN A 
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 125, 130–34 (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration ed., 
1995); Leslie Zines, The Sovereignty of the People, in POWER, PARLIAMENT AND THE PEOPLE 91, 104 
(Michael Coper and George Williams eds., 1997). 
 33. Nationwide News Party Ltd. v Wills (1992), 177 CLR 1, 71 (Austl.) (Deane, J., and  Toohey, 
J.); Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 CLR 106, 137–38 (Austl.) [ACTV] 
(Mason, C.J.); Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994), 182 CLR 104, 173 (Austl.) 
(Deane, J.); McGinty v W. Austl. (1996), 186 CLR 140, 199 (Austl.) (Toohey, J.). See generally 
George Winterton, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Continuity, 26 FED. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 34. This is a distinctly U.S. view of the democratic relationship and, based on the history of the 
framing of the Australian Constitution, is not sustainable. See, e.g., Leighton McDonald, The Denizens 
of Democracy: The High Court and the “Free Speech” Cases, 5 PUB. L. REV. 160 (1994); Paul Finn, 
A Sovereign People, a Public Trust, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 
1 (Vol. 1, Paul Finn ed., 1995); Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26 (manuscript at 4, on file with 
author); Harley G.A. Wright, Sovereignty of the People—The New Constitutional Grundnorm, 26 FED. 
L. REV. 165, 168 (1998). 
 35. ACTV, 177 CLR at 227–35 (McHugh, J.), 158–59 (Brennan, J.). See generally Stone, Limits, 
supra note 29. 
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broad institutions required protection by way of a judicially enforced 
right.
36
  
Therefore, for the early minority justices, it was not the broad concepts 
of representative and responsible government that gave rise to the implied 
right; rather, it was that the constitutional provisions establishing 
Parliament, the Executive and the referendum process, and any implied 
political free speech that would be necessarily linked to those provisions 
and what was necessary for the effective workings of those specific 
institutions.
37
 Under this approach, the implied right is tied to identifiable 
textual provisions rather than a more general concept of representative 
government, and the manifestation of the institutions of representative and 
responsible government in written form was seen as sufficient to imply a 
judicially protected right contrary to the traditional constitutional theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty.
38
 
B. Initial Interpretive Attack 
The ACTV majority justices were strongly attacked by commentators 
for their unorthodox interpretive methodology.
39
 At the center of the 
 
 
 36. Id.  
 37. For general analysis of the decisions, see Stone, supra note 29. 
 38. This is most explicitly recognized by Justice Brennan in Nationwide News, 177 CLR 1, 48. 
See also id. at 94 (Gaudron. J.); ACTV 177 CLR 106, 210–12 (Gaudron, J.); Stephens v W. Austl. 
Newspapers Ltd. (1994), 182 CLR 211, 232 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J., Toohey, J., and Gaudron, J.); 
Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994), 182 CLR 272, 298 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.), 336 (Deane, J.); McGinty 
(1996), 186 CLR at 198 (Toohey, J.), 216 (Gaudron, J.). See the discussion in Brian Galligan, The 
Australian High Court‟s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development, in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 184, 200 (Charles Sampford & Kim 
Preston eds., 1996); Sir Anthony Mason, The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern Liberal 
Democracy, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 13, 26–7 
(Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996); Cheryl Saunders, Democracy: Representation and 
Participation, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND GOVERNMENT: PRINCIPLES AND VALUES 51, 68–71 (Paul Finn 
ed., 1995), vol 1. 
 39. See, e.g., NICHOLAS ARONEY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE CONSTITUTION (1998); Nicholas 
Aroney, A Seductive Plausibility: Freedom of Speech in the Constitution, 18 U. QLD. L. REV. 249 
(1995) [hereinafter Aroney, A Seductive Plausibility]; Tom Campbell, Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Positive Law, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 195, 204–07 (1994); Stephen Donaghue, The Clamour of Silent 
Constitutional Principles, 24 FED. L. REV. 133 (1996); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Implications in 
Language, Law and the Constitution, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
150 (Geoffrey Lindell ed., 1994); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The High Court, Implied Rights, and 
Constitutional Change, 39 QUADRANT 46 (1995); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Implications 
and Freedom of Political Speech: A Reply to Stephen Donaghue, 23 MONASH U. L. REV. 362 (1997); 
Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, Classification, Examples, 24 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 645 (2000); Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and 
Democracy, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 24 (2001); Stone, Limits, supra note 29; Leslie Zines, A Judicially 
Created Bill of Rights?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 166, 177 (1994) [hereinafter Zines, A Judicially Created 
Bill of Rights?]. For an excellent overview of the theoretical aspects of the post-ACTV implication 
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interpretive disagreement was the majority justices‘ reliance on a 
contested method of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, interpretive 
disagreement is most likely where an implication rests upon unexpressed 
concepts or fundamental doctrines, at least with respect to implied 
fundamental rights. There were two principal criticisms, both of which 
struck at the core of the majority justices‘ approach. First, critics 
complained that the methodology employed to identify and ground the 
right was generally weak in its claim of necessity in the face of its reliance 
on tenuous historical premises.
40
 Second, it was argued that the majority 
justices‘ approach, with its reliance on the broad concepts of 
representative and responsible government, was too imprecise to provide a 
limit on government.
41
 
1. Interpretive Disagreement: Necessity and Interpretive Orthodoxy 
The first argument against the majority justices‘ grounding centered 
not on the question of whether an implied freedom of political 
communication was necessary, but whether, in the face of interpretive 
orthodoxy, any implied freedom necessarily gave rise to a judicially 
enforceable right.
42
 That is, although some critics may have accepted that 
some level of protection for political communication was necessary to 
ensure the efficient workings of the democratic system, the criticism was 
that the system of government entrenched in the Constitution did not give 
rise to such an implication. 
This argument was a key basis for the resistance of the sole ACTV 
dissenting justice, Justice Dawson,
43
 who argued that the framers of the 
 
 
debate, see Laurence Claus, Implication and the Concept of a Constitution, 69 AUST. L.J. 887 (1995). 
 40. See, e.g., Aroney, A Seductive Plausibility, supra note 39. Campbell, supra note 39, at 204–
07 (1994); Goldsworthy, supra note 39, at 150; Zines, A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?, supra note 
39, at 177.  
 41. See, e.g., Stone, Limits, supra note 29; Adrienne Stone, Rights, Personal Rights and 
Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 374 (2001) 
[hereinafter Stone, Rights]; Adrienne Stone, The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure Revisited, 
28 U.N.S.W.L.J. 842 (2005) [hereinafter Stone, Limits Revisited] (written as a response to a discussion 
of her ideas by Justice McHugh in Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1 (Austl.)); Winterton, supra 
note 12, at 121. 
 42. The term ―interpretive orthodoxy‖ was coined by Jeffrey Goldsworthy in Australia: Devotion 
to Legalism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 106, 147 (Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy ed., 2006).  
 43. Notably, Justice Dawson did acknowledge that some level of protection for political speech 
was necessary, that is, Justice Dawson held that the terms of the Constitution enshrined a limited 
principle of representative government that ensured that elections to the Commonwealth Parliament 
involved a true choice by electors. See Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 
CLR 106, 177–202 (Austl.) [ACTV] (Dawson, J., dissenting). 
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Australian Constitution had placed trust in the elected representatives of 
the people to uphold the basic freedoms of a democratic society, and, 
therefore, a judicially implied and protected limitation on legislative 
power was not ―necessary or obvious having regard to the express 
provisions of the Constitution itself.‖44 Justice Dawson held that there 
exists ―no warrant in the Constitution for the implication of any guarantee 
of freedom of communication which operates to confer rights upon 
individuals or to limit the legislative power of the Commonwealth.‖45  
Justice Dawson and similarly minded commentators argue that the 
framers of the Australian Constitution relied on democratic processes and 
the common law to defend fundamental rights and liberties.
46
 That the 
framers granted Parliament significant power to determine the form that 
representative democracy would take in Australia stands as, as argued by 
leading Australian constitutional scholar Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ―[t]he ‗lion 
in the path‘ of any argument that judicial enforcement of freedom of 
political speech is practically necessary for the effective operation of our 
representative democracy.‖47 The critics‘ argument does not rely on a 
preferred political theory; while the arguments of some critics may have 
had as their motivation a preference that political rights not be enforced by 
a counter-majoritarian judiciary, the core claim of this attack is that the 
system of government entrenched in the text of the Constitution does not 
give rise to such an implication.
48
 Justice Dawson, for example, specified 
that the implication was something ―for which the Constitution did not 
provide.‖49  
This interpretive disagreement, then, focuses on the majority justices‘ 
reinterpretation of the framers‘ organization of governmental structures in 
the Constitution. For the critics, the Australian Constitution simply did not 
 
 
 44. Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994), 182 CLR 104, 194 (Austl.) (Dawson, J., 
dissenting); see also Cunliffe, 182 CLR 272, 362 (Dawson, J., dissenting). 
 45. See Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 CLR 106, 184 (Austl.) 
[ACTV] (Dawson, J., dissenting).  
 46. See, e.g., Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994), 182 CLR 272, 298 at 361 (Dawson, J., 
dissenting); Austl. Broad. Corp. v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd. (2001) 208 CLR 199, 331–32 (Austl.) 
(Callinan, J.); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The High Court, Implied Rights, and Constitutional Change, 39 
QUADRANT 46 (1995). 
 47. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Implications and Freedom of Political Speech: A Reply 
to Stephen Donaghue 23 MONASH U. L. REV. 362, 372 (1997); see also Geoffrey Kennet, Implied 
Rights, in THE CAULDRON OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 89, 90 (Michael Coper & George Williams 
eds., 1997); Sir Anthony Mason, The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern Liberal Democracy, 
in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 13, 28 (Charles 
Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 48. See also Kennet, supra note 47, at 90; Mason, supra note 47, at 28. 
 49. Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272, 362 (Austl.) (Dawson, J., dissenting). 
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provide for judicially enforced rights protection; rather, it enshrined the 
political process as the final arbiter of fundamental rights disagreement.
50
 
Moreover, these critics argue that representative democracy clearly existed 
and was effectual for ninety years before a judicially enforceable freedom 
of communication was available to protect it.
51
  
2. Interpretive Disagreement: Broad Concepts versus Textual 
Foundations 
The second core criticism of the majority justices‘ interpretive 
methodology was that their reliance on general principles of representative 
and responsible government, independent of these institutions‘ 
constitutional textual foundations, was weak and imprecise.
52
 By locating 
the freedom in implications drawn from the Constitution, the majority 
justices ―sacrificed the clear textual basis said to be an essential 
requirement of judicial review.‖53 That is, it was not the per se making of 
the implication that was the cause of disagreement, it was the lack of any 
textual basis, and consequently the inherent subjectivity of the implied 
freedom.
54
 For Justice Dawson, this was another ground on which he 
objected to the majority justices‘ approach to the implication question. 
Justice Dawson disputed that any implications could be drawn from the 
general concepts of representative and responsible government that the 
majority discerned in the Constitution,
55
 stating that implications ―must 
 
 
 50. Goldsworthy, supra note 45, at 48–49. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Implications in Language, Law 
and the Constitution, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150, 179–80 
(Geoffrey Lindell ed., 1994) [hereinafter Goldsworthy, Implications]. 
 51. Goldsworthy, supra note 45, at 49; Goldsworthy, Implications, supra note 50, at 180 
(Geoffrey Lindell ed., 1994); see also Austl. Broad. Corp. v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd. (2001) 208 
CLR 199, 331 n.603, 337–38, (Austl.) (Callinan, J.); David Wood, Judicial Invalidation of Legislation 
and Democratic Principles, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 169, 178 (Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 52. See Goldsworthy, Implications, supra note 50, at 181; Stone, Limits, supra note 29.  
 53. Stephen Donaghue, The Clamour of Silent Constitutional Principles, 24 FED. L. REV. 133, 
134 (1996). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 
374–78 (1992); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696, 
698 (1976). 
 54. Although there was a period in Australian constitutional history where the High Court 
justices held the view that no implications could be made in interpreting the Constitution, implications 
have been a part of Australian constitutional interpretation since Federation. See, e.g., West v. Comm‘r 
of Taxation (NSW) (1937), 56 CLR 657 (Austl.); Stephen Donaghue, The Clamour of Silent 
Constitutional Principles, 24 FED. L. REV. 133, 134 (1996). For examples of implications drawn from 
federalism see Melbourne Corp. v. Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 (Austl.), and Queensland Elect. 
Comm‟n v. Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192 (Austl.). 
 55. Austl. Cap. Television Pty Ltd. v Commonwealth (1992), 177 CLR 106, 185 (Austl.) [ACTV]. 
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appear from the terms of the instrument itself and not from extrinsic 
circumstances.‖56  
The idea of an implication deriving from general principles was also 
disavowed by Justices McHugh and Brennan. Contrary to Justice Dawson, 
however, these justices were willing to recognize the existence of an 
implied right, so long as any implication was directly tied to what the 
textual provisions of the Constitution required.
57
 Justice McHugh wrote: 
If this Court is to retain the confidence of the nation as the final 
arbiter of what the Constitution means, no interpretation of the 
Constitution by the Court can depart from the text of the 
Constitution and what is implied by the text and structure of the 
Constitution.
58
 
C. Doctrinal Retreat in the Face of Interpretive Controversy 
1. The Relentless Disagreement 
As more cases came before the High Court, the interpretive divide 
between the justices became more marked. Despite a ―vigorous theoretical 
and critical commentary,‖59 the majority justices persisted with their 
controversial interpretive approach, continuing to draw various 
implications from the broad concepts of representative and responsible 
government.
60
 Those justices that preferred a methodology that grounded 
the implication in the text of the Constitution continued to argue that an 
interpretive theory drawing implications from general concepts was 
unsustainable.
61
 This more conservative view of the appropriate 
 
 
 56. Id. at 181 (Dawson, J.); see also The King v Smithers (1912) 16 CLR 99, 113 (Isaacs, J.); 
Queensland Elect. Comm‟n v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192, 231 (Austl.) (Brennan, J.); cf. 
Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd. (1926) 37 CLR 393, 411–412 (Austl.) (Isaacs, J.). 
 57. Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1993), 182 CLR 272, 395 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.); Theophanous 
(1994), 182 CLR 104, 195–204 (Austl.) (McHugh, J.); McGinty (1996), 186 CLR 140, 229–36 (Austl.) 
(McHugh, J.).  
 58. Theophanous, 182 CLR at 197 (McHugh, J.). 
 59. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Australia: Devotion to Legalism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 106, 146 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
 60. See, e.g., Cunliffe,182 CLR 272, 298 (Mason, C.J.); Theophanous, 182 CLR 104, 120–21 
(Mason, C.J., Toohey, J., and Gaudron, J.), 147 (Brennan, J.), 163, 180 (Deane, J.); Stephens v W. 
Austl. Newspapers Ltd. (1994), 182 CLR 211, 232 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J., Toohey, J., and Gaudron, J.); 
Muldowney v S. Austl. (1996), 186 CLR 352, 373 (Austl.) (Toohey, J.). 
 61. McGinty v W. Austl. (1996) 186 CLR 140, 168–170 (Austl.) (Brennan, C.J.); id. at 182–84 
(Dawson, J.), 199 (Toohey, J.), 231–32, 235–36 (McHugh, J.), 291 (Gummow, J.), cf. id. at 216 
(Gaudron, J.). On the importance of McGinty, see Lange v Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997), 189 CLR 520, 
566–67 (Austl.) (Brennan, C.J., Dawson, J., Toohey, J., Gaudron, J., McHugh, J., Gummow, J., Kirby, 
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interpretive theory in the Australian constitutional context led Justice 
McHugh to dissent in the next major political communication cases, 
Theophanous and its companion case Stephens v. Western Australian 
Newspapers Ltd.
62
 In those cases, Justice McHugh strengthened his attack 
on the majority justices‘ approach, arguing that by treating representative 
democracy as part of the Constitution independent of specific provisions, 
the majority justices ―unintentionally depart[ed] from the method of 
constitutional interpretation that has existed in this country since the time 
of the Engineers‟ Case [in 1920].‖63 
Following the departures of three of the majority justices, Chief Justice 
Mason and Justices Dean and Toohey, ―a more conservative mood began 
to take hold in the Court.‖64 Conscious of the broad criticism of the 
interpretive theory of the implied freedom,
65
 the textual (and less 
controversial) approach to the implications question began to influence the 
Court. The early shift can be seen in the 1996 case of McGinty v. Western 
Australia,
66
 where the former minority justices suddenly found themselves 
in the majority. In a number of individual judgments, the ―new majority‖ 
rejected the majority justices‘ ACTV approach that the Constitution 
contained a ―free standing‖ implication of representative government from 
which rights could be drawn. While holding that some form of implied 
freedom of political communication existed in the Constitution, they 
instead argued, as Justice McHugh had consistently held, that any implied 
 
 
J.); David Wiseman, Implied Political Rights and Freedoms, in FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A 
CONTEMPORARY VIEW 346 (Melissa Castan & Sarah Joseph eds., 2001). On the influence of Justice 
McHugh on the interpretive direction of the implied freedom, see Andrew Lynch, Dissent: The 
Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. L. R 724, 
748 n.113 (2003), and Stone, Limits, supra note 29, at 673.  
 62. Theophanous, 182 CLR at 104; Stephens v W. Austl. Newspapers Ltd. (1994), 182 CLR 211 
(Austl.). 
 63. Theophanous, 182 CLR 202. The reference to the ―Engineers‟ Case‖ refers to the 1920 case 
of Amalgamated Soc‟y of Eng‟rs v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129 (Austl.), in which 
the Court asserted the dominance of textualism in constitutional interpretation, stating:  
It is . . . the manifest duty of this Court to turn its earnest attention to the provisions of the 
Constitution itself. That instrument is the political compact of the whole of the people of 
Australia . . . and it is the chief and special duty of this Court faithfully to expound and give 
effect to it according to its own terms, finding the intention from the words of the compact, 
and upholding it throughout precisely as framed. 
Id. at 142. 
 64. See Stone, Limits, supra note 29, at 673.  
 65. McGinty v W. Austl. (1996), 186 CLR 140, 168–70 (Austl.) (Brennan, C.J.), 182–184 
(Dawson, J.), 199 (Toohey, J.), 231–32, 235–36 (McHugh, J.), 291 (Gummow, J.); Stone, supra note 
29, at 673.  
 66. McGinty, 186 CLR at 140 (Austl.) (rejecting the argument that the principle of representative 
democracy implied a right of equal or equal-sized electorates for the Western Australian State 
Parliament). 
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right deriving from the concept of representative government must be 
directly linked to the ―text‖ or the ―structure‖ of the Constitution.67 
McGinty then suggested that a majority of the new Court were unwilling 
to ground the implied right in broad concepts unrelated to the text or the 
clear intent of the framers.
68
 
2. Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation: The Ascendancy of 
Justice McHugh‟s Text and Structure Approach 
In an attempt to resolve the interpretive disagreements about the 
justification for the implied freedom, the High Court delivered a 
unanimous judgment in the seminal 1997 case of Lange v. Australian 
Broadcasting Corp.
69
 The Court rejected the majority justices‘ revisionist 
view of the original intentions of the framers regarding rights protection, 
and in Lange, ―there [is] no appeal to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Australian people‖ in grounding the implied freedom.70 The Court instead 
held that the implied freedom was to be drawn from the text and structure 
of the Constitution, not ―vague theories of representative democracy said 
to underlie the constitutional system.‖71 For the Court,  
the Constitution gives effect to the institution of ―representative 
government‖ only to the extent that the text and structure of the 
Constitution establish it . . . . [T]he relevant question is not, ―What 
is required by representative and responsible government?‖ It is, 
―What do the terms and structure of the Constitution prohibit, 
authorise or require?‖72 
 
 
 67. Id. at 171 (Brennan, C.J.) (―The principle of representative democracy . . . can be no wider 
than—for it is synonymous with—what inheres in the text of the Constitution or in its structure.‖), 
180–83 (Dawson, J.), 233 (McHugh, J.), 281–83 (Gummow, J.). 
 68. George Winterton, Constitutionally Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to 
Ends?, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 121 (Charles 
Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 69. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520 (Austl.). 
 70. Harley G.A. Wright, Sovereignty of the People—The New Constitutional Grundnorm, 26 
FED. L. REV. 165, 175 (1998); Lange, 189 CLR at 557; see also Andrew Fraser, False Hopes: Implied 
Rights and Popular Sovereignty in the Australian Constitution, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 213, 222–24 
(1994); Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26, at 243 (2007); George Winterton, Constitutionally 
Entrenched Common Law Rights: Sacrificing Means to Ends?, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: 
THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 121, 135–42 (Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 
1996). 
 71. Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26, at 243; see also Lange, 189 CLR at 557–59. 
 72. Lange, 189 CLR at 566–67, 557.  
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Having eschewed broad principles in favor of text and structure, the Lange 
Court specified that there were three elements of representative and 
responsible government detectable in the Constitution: (1) sections 7 and 
24, directing that members of Parliament be chosen ―directly by the 
people‖ at election;73 (2) the establishment of the relationship between 
Parliament and the Executive;
74
 and (3) section 128 of the Constitution, 
specifying the procedure for amendment of the Constitution by 
referendum.
75
 For the Lange Court, the implied freedom of political 
communication exists only so far as necessary to enable these 
constitutional institutions to function. Consequently, discussion about 
government and political matters must relate to the choice for electors at 
federal elections, amendment of the Constitution, or the administration of 
the federal government.
76
  
D. The Persistence of Interpretive Disagreement: The Failure of Lange as 
an Interpretive Solution 
The sustained interpretive disagreement regarding the foundation of the 
implied freedom forced the High Court‘s interpretive retreat into text and 
structure. By emphasizing that the implied freedom is to be interpreted 
only with reference to the text and structure of the Constitution, and 
without any reference to underlying theories or broad principles, the Court 
has consciously attempted to both suppress interpretive disagreement 
within the Court and to answer scholarly criticisms of the implication‘s 
 
 
 73. Id. at 538. The Court relied on Section 1 (vesting Commonwealth legislative power to the 
Parliament), Sections 8 and 30 (electors for the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, to 
vote only once), Section 25 (persons of any race disqualified from voting at elections not to be counted 
in determining Section 24 electorates), Section 28 (duration of the House of Representatives), and 
section 13 (setting the longest term for Senators at six years). AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 1, 8, 13, 
24, 25, 28, 30. 
 74. Lange, 189 CLR at 558–59 (Austl.). The Court relied on Section 6 (requiring Parliament to 
sit at least once a year), Section 62 (executive power of the Queen to be exercised on the advice of 
ministers in cabinet), Section 49 (providing authority for each House of Parliament to summon 
witnesses or require document production), and Section 83 (requiring that money be appropriated from 
the treasury in accordance with the law). AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 6, 49, 62, 83. 
 75. Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997), 189 CLR 520, 559 (Austl.). 
 76. Id. at 560–61. Although, as with any constitutional right, the protection accorded to these 
matters is not absolute and Lange specified a two-stage test by which the impugned law would be 
judged. Id. at 567. That is, the question of what kinds of communications are protected by the implied 
freedom is only the first stage of the enquiry. In the constitutional context, if it can be shown that the 
law said to burden the implied freedom is ―reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate 
end,‖ Coleman v Power (2004), 220 CLR 1, 13 (Austl.), the communication will not be protected by 
the implied freedom. For discussion of the ―reasonably appropriate and adapted‖ test, see Jeremy Kirk, 
Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 
1 (1997); Stone, Limits, supra note 29. 
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textual foundations.
77
 To a limited extent the Court‘s move was 
successful; the result of Lange is that by weight of the authority of the 
decision and its persistent application, the implied freedom now appears to 
be relatively secure from the possibility of reconsideration.
78
 However, the 
controversy and misgivings surrounding the initial implication and its 
textual and historical foundations have had ongoing effects on the content 
of the implied freedom. Heightened judicial self-consciousness over the 
legitimacy of the foundations of the implied freedom have produced 
marked judicial over-confidence in the potential of ―text and structure,‖ 
resulting in a paucity of interpretive resources and, consequently, a 
number of hesitations and uncertainties in the development of the right. 
The initial interpretive disagreement over the foundation of the right, and 
the Court‘s subsequent retreat into the ―safe harbour [sic] of constitutional 
text and structure,‖79 has had an ongoing impact on the development of the 
implied freedom despite the unanimous statement in Lange. 
1. Text and Structure: Self-Imposed Methodological Limit 
The unanimous approval in Lange that constitutional interpretations are 
founded in its ―text and structure‖ as well as the resulting dispersal of 
judicial and scholarly disquiet over the foundations of the implied freedom 
has resulted in misplaced confidence in the determinative power of 
constitutional text and structure by the justices of the High Court.
80
 To 
some degree this is understandable; the initial interpretive disagreement 
has left the justices wary about any reflection on the principles guiding the 
implied freedom, as the inevitable consequence of any such reflection 
would force the justices to engage with the foundations of the implication 
itself. Reliance on text in constitutional interpretation is a powerful form 
of methodological argument, and the justices seem to believe that text 
 
 
 77. Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, at 43; Adrienne Stone & Simon Evans, 
Freedom of Speech and Insult in the High Court of Australia, 4 INT‘L J. CONST. LAW 677, 678 (2006) 
[hereinafter Stone & Evans, Freedom of Speech and Insult]. For an argument that the High Court is 
peculiarly responsive to academic criticism, see Michael Coper, The High Court and Free Speech: 
Visions of Democracy or Delusions of Grandeur?, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 185, 194 (1994). 
 78. Excluding the new appointees, Justices Crennan and Keifel, Justice Callinan is alone in 
expressing doubts as to the legitimacy of the implication. See, e.g., Coleman, 220 CLR at 29–30 
(Gleeson, C.J.), 43–44 (McHugh, J.), 78 (Gummow, J., and Hayne, J.), 82 (Kirby, J.), 108–09, 113–14 
(Callinan, J.), 120 (Heydon, J,); Mulholland v. Austl. Electoral Comm‘n (2004), 220 CLR 181, 200–01 
(Austl.) (Gleeson, C.J.), 217–18 (McHugh, J.), 244–45 (Gummow, J., and Hayne, J.), 293–94 
(Callinan, J.), 305–06 (Heydon, J.). 
 79. Stone, Limits Revisited, supra note 41, at 845. 
 80. Stone & Evans, Freedom of Speech and Insult, supra note 77, at 687–88 (2006).  
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alone is sufficient to quell any interpretive disquiet regarding the implied 
freedom.  
The High Court‘s ―text alone‖ approach is evident in a number of 
recent implied freedom cases where a majority of justices have been 
content to state that the text supports or does not support a particular 
argument without detailed consideration. This is the approach that five of 
the seven justices took in the 2004 case of Coleman v. Power,
81
 where the 
constitutional validity of a Queensland state law prohibiting insulting 
language was challenged. The case raised the significant and unresolved 
question of whether, pursuant to the implied freedom, insulting words 
could constitute communications about government or political matters.
82
 
While the majority stated that the implied freedom was infringed, their 
reasoning was limited to broad statements as to the political nature of the 
insulting words in question. Chief Justice Gleeson, for example, stated, 
―[l]et it be accepted that his conduct was, in the broadest sense, 
‗political‘.‖83 Justice McHugh specified that insults are a ―legitimate part 
of the political discussion protected by the Constitution.‖84 None of the 
justices engaged with the broader relationship between insult and political 
communication, nor questioned whether, for example, insult can be 
prohibited to prevent intimidation or to promote civility. 
The Court‘s most recent decision on the implied freedom, APLA Ltd v. 
Legal Services Commissioner (NSW),
85
 evidences a similar confidence that 
the terms of the Constitution can be mechanically applied. APLA 
concerned a challenge to state regulations that prohibited advertising of 
legal services for personal injury matters; the plaintiffs claimed that this 
prohibition on lawyer-client communications was a government or 
political matter and therefore infringed the implied freedom.
86
 The judicial 
consideration of this important claim was cursory at best. In fact, Justice 
McHugh was the only justice to give sustained attention to the 
determinative question of whether lawyer-client communications can be 
characterized as a government or political matter.
87
 The approach of the 
other justices mirrors that of Chief Justice Gleeson and Justice Heydon 
 
 
 81. Coleman v Power (2004), 220 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Coleman, 220 CLR at 30 (Gleeson, C.J.). 
 84. Id. at 54 (McHugh, J.) 
 85. APLA Ltd. v Legal Servs. Comm‟r (NSW) [2005] 44 HCA 322 (Austl.) [APLA]. 
 86. Id. ¶ 14 (Gleeson, C.J., and Heydon, J.). 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 60–71 (McHugh, J.); cf. Id. ¶¶ 217–219 (Gummow, J.), ¶ 342 (Kirby, J.), ¶¶ 377–382 
(Hayne, J.), ¶¶ 453, 457–461 (Callinan, J.). See generally Zoë Guest, The Judiciary and the Freedom 
of Political Communication: The Protection of Judgment on Australia‟s Judges, 17 PUB. L. REV. 5 
(2006).  
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who in their joint judgment simply asserted that ―[r]estrictions on the 
marketing of legal services are not incompatible with a system of 
representative or responsible government.‖88 In support of this claim, the 
justices stated that were any incompatibility to exist, it ―has passed 
unnoticed for most of the time since Federation.‖89 
2. The Continuing Consequences of Interpretive Disagreement 
The intersection of judicial self-consciousness in the face of 
interpretive disagreement and judicial over-confidence in the certainty of 
text and structure as a comprehensive interpretive methodology has had 
significant consequences.
90
 The Court‘s self-imposed methodological 
limitation in relation to the implied freedom has resulted in a paucity of 
interpretive resources and, consequently, difficulties in the development of 
the right. That is, although text and structure may answer doubts about the 
foundation of the implied freedom, as Adrienne Stone has convincingly 
argued, it is not possible to understand the extent of the implied freedom 
without reference to some ideas and values external to the text of the 
Constitution.
91
 By responding to the objections to ACTV (i.e., that general 
principles should not be employed as a basis for an implied right and 
foreswearing recourse to any extra-constitutional principles), the Court has 
―deprived itself of the tools it needs to develop the freedom of political 
communication in a coherent manner.‖92  
 
 
 88. APLA, 44 HCA 322, ¶ 29 (Gleeson, C.J., and Heydon, J.).  
 89. Id. The irony of this justification is that this remains the key argument against the initial 
judicial implication and enforcement of the implied freedom. 
 90. Dan Meagher, What is „Political Communication‟? The Rationale and Scope of the Implied 
Freedom of Political Communication, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 438 (2004) [hereinafter Meagher, What is 
„Political Communication‟?]; Zoë Guest, The Judiciary and the Freedom of Political Communication: 
The Protection of Judgment on Australia‟s Judges, 17 PUB. L. REV. 5 (2006); Stellios, Using 
Federalism, supra note 26; Stone, Limits, supra note 29; Stone, Rights, supra note 41; Stone, 
Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15.  
 91. Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, at 43; see also Deborah Cass, Through the 
Looking Glass: The High Court and the Right to Speech, 4 PUB. L. REV. 229, 246 (1994) (arguing that 
ACTV failed to articulate a theory of free speech and that such a theory was necessary for future 
development of the implied freedom). 
 92. Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15. Indeed, the Court must inevitably draw on 
some extra-constitutional principles, and attempting to suppress their influence merely prevents the 
full rationalization of explication of its reasoning. On this point, see, for example, Brian Horrigan, 
Paradigm Shifts in Interpretation: Reframing Legal and Constitutional Reasoning, in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS: THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 31, 35–36 (Charles Sampford & Kim 
Preston eds., 1996); Jeremy Kirk, Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and 
Democracy, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 24, 52 (2001); Stone & Evans, Freedom of Speech and Insult, supra 
note 77. 
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The difficulties of such a determinedly anti-theoretical approach have 
been demonstrated in a number of areas of the Court‘s implied freedom 
jurisprudence, but three difficulties have been particularly evident post-
Lange: the continued problem of justifying a judicially enforceable right, 
the development of a standard of review, and the development of the scope 
of the implied freedom. 
a. Existence of a Judicially Enforceable “Right”  
Despite successfully anchoring the implied freedom in the text and 
structure of the Constitution, disagreement remains about the third step of 
the Lange approach: the need for a judicially enforceable limitation on 
legislative and executive power to protect communication required for 
those institutions to function effectively.
93
 Reliance on constitutional text 
fails to answer the originalist argument made against the implication: that 
the constitutional framers determined that rights protection was best left to 
the legislative branch, and any implication that imposes a judicially 
enforceable limitation on legislative and executive power is contrary to 
interpretive orthodoxy.
94
  
Constitutional text simply cannot answer this critique; the implied 
freedom lacks specific textual recognition, and the text and structure 
approach of Lange does nothing to address the incompatibility of the 
implied freedom with orthodox understandings of the democratic 
arrangements under the Australian Constitution.  
b. Standards of Review 
A second uncertainty under the Lange doctrine regards the scope of 
protection provided to any communications covered by the implied 
freedom. Adrienne Stone has provided an extensive examination of this 
issue, arguing that the Court‘s exclusive reliance on text and structure in 
defining the implied freedom is unsustainable because, at some point, the 
Court must chose a standard of review when applying the Lange test.
95
 As 
Stone argues, any choice between, for example, a proportionality test or a 
U.S.-style strict scrutiny test necessarily depends on extra-constitutional 
values and ideas, such as the level of deference given to legislative 
 
 
 93. See Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26, at 243–45. 
 94. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The High Court, Implied Rights, and Constitutional Change, 39 
QUADRANT 46 (1995). 
 95. See Stone, Limits, supra note 29, at 696–99.  
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judgments and the rationale of the implied freedom itself—the very values 
and ideals which the text and structure approach eschews.
96
  
Although Lange appeared to identify a test in the unanimous judgment, 
differences immediately arose in the subsequent case of Levy v. Victoria.
97
 
These differences have carried into the recent decisions in Coleman and 
APLA, with significant variation in the various justices‘ formulation of the 
test
98
 and in the qualitative inquiry undertaken.
99
 As Stone states,  
[d]eciding on an answer to the standard of review question will 
require that the High Court depart from its commitment to text . . . 
and develop the freedom of political communication by reference to 
some values or ideas that are not, at least according to the High 
Court‘s avowed interpretive method, readily identifiable in the 
Constitution.
100
 
c. Coverage of the Implied Freedom 
The Court‘s dogged avoidance of extra-constitutional values and the 
adherence to text and structure has also had adverse consequences for the 
coverage of the implied freedom. Following Lange, ―political 
communication‖ for the purposes of the implied freedom is 
communication that demonstrates a ―nexus‖ between the communication 
 
 
 96. Stone, Limits, supra note 29; Stone, Limits Revisited, supra note 41. See also Meagher, What 
is „Political Communication‟?, supra note 103. 
 97. Levy v Victoria (1997), 189 CLR 579 (Austl.). See Stone, Limits, supra note 29, at 675–87.  
 98. For example, the Lange test was slightly modified by the majority in Coleman. Coleman v 
Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 30 (Austl.) (Gleeson, C.J.), 57, 61–62 (McHugh, J.). However, that 
modification was not applied by the other three judges in the subsequent case of APLA. APLA Ltd. v 
Legal Servs. Comm‟r (NSW) [2005] 44 HCA 322 (Austl.) [APLA]. Additionally, some judges seem to 
prefer a form of words that differs from that adopted in Lange, as evidenced in argument during the 
hearing of APLA. See Transcript of Proceedings, APLA (High Court of Australia, 6 October 2004). 
 99. See, e.g., Coleman, 220 CLR 1 (Austl). In Coleman, Chief Justice Gleeson stated that ―the 
balance struck by the [legislature] is not unusual, and I am unable to conclude that the legislation, in 
its application to this case, is not suitable to the end of maintaining public order in a manner consistent 
with an appropriate balance of all the various rights, freedoms, and interests, which require 
consideration.‖ Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Justice Callinan stated that a preferable formulation of the 
requirement that the legislation in question be ―reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving a 
legitimate object or end‖ was whether it was ―a reasonable implementation of a legitimate object.‖ Id. 
at 110 (emphasis added). Justice Heydon noted that ―[t]he question is not ‗Is this provision the best?‘, 
but ‗Is this provision a reasonably adequate attempt at solving the problem?‘‖ Id. at 124 (emphasis 
added). While purporting to apply the Lange test, these formulations of the inquiry exhibit a greater 
willingness to defer to legislative judgments about the regulation of political communication. See also 
Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26; Stone & Evans, Freedom of Speech and Insult, supra note 
77, at 679–80. 
 100. See Stone, Limits, supra note 29, at 671.  
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and the choice for electors at federal elections, amendment of the 
Constitution, or the administration of the federal government.
101
 However, 
while it may seem that this method provides a tightly constrained category 
of communication that counts as political, the text of the Constitution in 
fact provides no guidance in this regard. What is relevantly ―political,‖ 
then, will necessarily be guided by an individual justice‘s views as to the 
rationale of the implied freedom and whether or not that rationale is 
expressly articulated. That is, whether a communication is considered 
―political‖ and thus protected depends upon its relevance to the institution 
of representative government in question. As James Stellios has argued, 
that question is one that necessarily depends upon justices‘ differing 
conceptions of ―how communication informs the political process.‖102 
The difficulty with purporting to rely solely on text, when that text is 
too bare to provide clear guidance in any case, is demonstrated by the 
limited scope of the existing law on the scope of the ―political 
communication.‖ Since Lange, the Court has not provided an authoritative 
statement on what constitutes ―political communication,‖ however, its 
decisions indicate a narrow definition, extending the coverage of implied 
freedom only to explicit discussion of both actual and proposed federal 
government and opposition policies as well as the conduct of the federal 
Parliament‘s members and candidates.103  
However, many other issues may be relevant to electoral choice, for 
example: public issues not currently on the legislative agenda (i.e., failure 
to adopt a policy);
104
 issues that are not themselves political but that may 
reveal parliamentary attitudes towards particular religious, sociological, 
moral, or philosophical debates;
105
 and issues relevant to state elections. 
Considering the high level of integration between the levels of 
government, it is often difficult to distinguish the level at which a 
―political matter‖ occurs.106 The Court‘s determination to refer only to the 
terms of the Constitution, then, provides no principled limits on what 
constitutes ―political communication‖ and provides little or no guidance 
for the resolution of any given case. 
The resulting artificiality of the text and structure approach is best 
demonstrated by the recent decision in APLA.
107
 As noted above, APLA 
 
 
 101. Lange v Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997), 189 CLR 520, 560–61 (Opinion of the Court). 
 102. Stellios, Using Federalism, supra note 26, 262 (2007). 
 103. Dan Meagher, What is „Political Communication‟?, supra note 103. 
 104. See Stone, Limits, supra note 29.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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involved the argument that, among other things, restrictions on the 
advertising of legal services relating to entitlements arising out of personal 
injuries infringed the implied freedom. Justice McHugh considered 
whether communications regarding judicial officers generally fell within 
the ambit of ―government and political matters,‖ and held that 
communications concerning the conduct of judges and the reasoning in or 
result of cases do not fall within the scope of the implied freedom. His 
Honor stated that ―[c]ourts and judges and the exercise of judicial power 
are not themselves subjects that are involved in representative or 
responsible government in the constitutional sense . . . . Nor are they 
communications concerning ‗political‘ matters in the sense referred to in 
Lange.‖108 This surely cannot be correct; far beyond the appointment and 
removal of judges
109
 the judiciary is, at the most fundamental level, 
inextricably linked to the constitutional conceptions of representative and 
responsible government.
110
  
E. Preliminary Conclusions 
Despite the unanimous decision in Lange grounding the implied 
freedom in the text and structure of the Australian Constitution, the 
doctrine remains weighted with uncertainties. As this Part argues, these 
uncertainties are a direct result of the initial interpretive disagreement 
surrounding the foundations of the implied freedom and the Court‘s 
attempt to assuage the judicial and scholarly criticism over the initial 
implication by more firmly grounding the implied freedom in the text of 
the Constitution. However, the Court‘s insistence that text alone is a 
sufficient basis for the implied freedom has arguably impeded the 
development of the doctrine, as text alone cannot sustain the incremental 
development of the implied freedom when the Court is faced with novel 
situations.  
In seeking to address the interpretive disagreement over the initial 
implication, then, the High Court has backed itself into an interpretive 
 
 
 108. APLA Ltd. v Legal Servs. Comm‟r (NSW) [2005] 44 HCA 322, ¶ 66 (Austl.) [APLA] 
(McHugh, J.). 
 109. Acknowledging that, Justice McHugh in APLA does recognize a broader category of 
communications that could be covered by the implied freedom. APLA, 44 HCA 322, ¶ 68 (McHugh, 
J.). 
 110. For a lengthy discussion, see Zoë Guest, The Judiciary and the Freedom of Political 
Communication: The Protection of Judgment on Australia‟s Judges, 17 PUB. L. REV. 5 (2006); see 
also Justice Ronald Sackville, Speech delivered at the 13th Lucinda Lecture, Monash University, How 
Fragile are the Courts? Freedom of Speech and Criticism of the Judiciary (Aug. 29, 2005).  
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corner where it needs to employ extra-constitutional resources to ensure a 
principled development of the implied freedom; however, the interpretive 
approach in Lange forswears that approach. The Court is thus left in the 
invidious position of being forced by necessity to develop the implied 
freedom while being unable to justify why it is doing so. 
III. THE UNITED STATES IMPLIED RIGHT TO AN ABORTION 
As with the Australian implied freedom of political communication, a 
woman‘s right to an abortion has been implied from the U.S. Constitution 
by the Supreme Court.
111
 Like the Australian implied freedom, the implied 
right to an abortion has been the subject of intense disagreement as to the 
legitimacy of the majority‘s interpretive methodology in recognizing the 
initial implication.
112
 Of course, unlike the interpretive debate over 
Australian implied freedom, the question of interpretive legitimacy in 
relation to Roe is largely fueled by extra-legal factors, namely intensely 
held views on the moral status of the fetus and the right of women to 
reproductive autonomy.
113
 The moral character of the implied rights 
debate in the United States has energized significant political debate over 
the implied right and a natural reaction to the claim in this Article, that the 
Supreme Court‘s revisions in relation to the implied right to an abortion 
stem directly from the interpretive controversy about Roe, is that the 
interpretive arguments merely function as a cipher for these external, 
value-laden concerns. 
However, this critique has its limits: scholars have strongly criticized 
the interpretive approach in Roe,
114
 and further, it is the interpretive 
controversy that provides the opponents to the implied right with a potent, 
 
 
 111. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 112. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.  
 113. On the extra-legal factors founding disagreement about Roe even within the Supreme Court, 
see Jenny R. Kramer, Compliance with Supreme Court Jurisprudence in the Post Roe and Casey Era, 
11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 529, 567 (2001). See also Geoffrey Stone, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW 
SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Apr. 20, 2007, 15:01 CT), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/ 
our_faithbased_.html#more. 
 114. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe 
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1984–1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185 (1992); Tyler Baker, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle? 26 STAN. 
L. REV. 1161 (1974); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1973); Richard Gregory Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the 
Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1979); Lawrence Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term—
Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 381 (1992). 
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respectable, and ostensibly apolitical constitutional argument.
115
 For 
example, Justice Scalia, a leading critic of Roe, openly values the right of 
the unborn fetus (at any stage of in utero development) over the rights of 
the mother,
116
 yet his attack on Roe is not grounded in religion or morality, 
but rather in the interpretive techniques that the Roe majority did (or did 
not) employ in grounding the implied right.
117
 Whether or not the 
interpretive disagreement is informed by other concerns, then, it is the 
interpretive criticisms that the U.S. Supreme Court, like Australia‘s High 
Court, has purported to address.
118
 
While the constitutional contexts of Australia and the United States are 
clearly different,
119
 with rights occupying a far stronger constitutional 
position in the latter,
120
 the distortions in the development of the 
Australian implied freedom, namely the influence of judicial self-
consciousness about the vulnerability of the right and the lack of 
contextual support for doctrinal development, are also evident in the 
development of the U.S. implied abortion right. As with the implied 
freedom, the interpretive disagreement over the implied right centers on 
the privileging of the interpretive methodologies of textualism and 
originalism, and in both legal cultures, it is these arguments that largely 
fuel the interpretive disagreement over implied rights.
121
 
 
 
 115. David Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? (2003) 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 380. At a more 
abstract level, see Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22, 41 (1991).  
 116. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 117. Justice Scalia argues that abortion is not a liberty protected by the Constitution ―because of 
two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding 
traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.‖ Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.). 
 118. Admittedly, this is a contentious claim. On the moral and religious motivations of the judicial 
decisions regarding abortion, see, for example, Geoffrey Stone, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW 
SCHOOL FACULTY BLOG (Apr. 20, 2007, 15:01 CT), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/ 
our_faithbased_.html#more. 
 119. Although, note that the two systems are often compared. See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Interpretive 
Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign 
Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 842–43 (2004); Andrew Lynch, 
Dissent: The Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia, 27 MELB. U. 
L. REV. 724, 746–47, 757, 768 (2003). For an example of comparative work involving free speech, 
see, for example, William G. Buss, Alexander Meiklejohn, American Constitutional Law, and 
Australia‟s Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 34 FED. L. REV. 421 (2006); Gerald 
Rosenberg & John Williams, Do Not Go Gently into that Good Right: The First Amendment in the 
High Court of Australia, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 439 (1997). 
 120. The Australian Constitution is ―in textual and historical terms . . . inhospitable to rights.‖ 
Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, at 46 (2005); see also Sir Anthony Mason, The 
Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern Liberal Democracy, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: 
THEORIES, PRINCIPLES, AND INSTITUTIONS 13, 23 (Charles Sampford & Kim Preston eds., 1996). 
 121. See discussion Part III.B.1; Michael Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or 
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A. Recognizing the Implied Right 
The implied right to an abortion was first recognized in the 1973 case 
Roe v. Wade and its companion case of Doe v. Bolton. Importantly, 
however, the foundation for the Roe decision was established in the 1965 
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Supreme Court held that 
Connecticut legislative restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married 
couples violated a ―right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.‖122 The 
Court held that various provisions of the Constitution, including the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, created ―zones of privacy,‖123 and 
privacy was a ―fundamental personal right.‖124 In its decision in Eisenstadt 
v. Baird
125
 seven years later, the Court extended this holding to unmarried 
couples, stating that, ―[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.‖126 
1. The Majority Decision in Roe 
A seven justice majority, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell,
127
 noted that the 
Court‘s previous decisions implying a right of privacy from the provisions 
of the Constitution protected ―fundamental‖ rights ―implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.‖128 Undertaking a detailed examination of the history of 
 
 
How Charles Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional 
Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J. 833, 839, 843 (2004); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional 
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 (1996); see also John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: 
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Mark Tushnet, Returning With Interest: 
Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 325, 335–36 (1998). See also the comments of Justice Scalia in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 918, 956 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 122. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). The Griswold opinion noted a number of 
earlier cases where the Court had protected privacy and autonomy in family matters, including, for 
example, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court had also employed the 
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate laws relating to marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 
(1967). 
 123. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. 
 124. Id. at 494.  
 125. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 126. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).  
 127. The opinion of the Court was authored by Justice Blackmun. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
116 (1973).  
 128. Id. at 152 (referring to the privacy right as derived in Griswold and Eisenstadt) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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abortion laws, the Court argued that restrictive abortion laws were a 
relatively recent phenomenon introduced not to save potential lives, but to 
protect women‘s health, an interest that ―has largely disappeared.‖129 For 
the Court, the physical and psychological burdens of pregnancy are so 
great that the right of privacy, whether founded in the concept of personal 
liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the 
Ninth Amendment, which reserves rights to the people, was ―broad 
enough to encompass a woman‘s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.‖130  
The Court held that while the right of personal privacy protecting a 
woman‘s right to an abortion is fundamental, this right is not absolute,131 
and access to abortion can be restricted where there is a compelling state 
interest.
132
 Although declining to make a ruling on when life begins,
133
 or 
find that a fetus was a ―person‖ for constitutional purposes,134 the Court 
held that the state has interests in the following: first, the health of the 
mother, which becomes compelling in the second trimester (until this 
point, the Court held, an abortion was no more dangerous than carrying a 
pregnancy to term);
135
 and second, in the preservation of potential life, 
which the Court held only becomes compelling at the end of second 
trimester, when the fetus reaches viability—at which point the Court 
determined the fetus has the ―capability of a meaningful life outside the 
mother‘s womb.‖136 
 
 
 129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 149, 135–36. 
 130. Id. at 153. On the foundations of the right to privacy, see supra notes 122–24 and 
accompanying text. See also Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the 
Constitution?, 58 NOTRE DAME L. R. 445 (1983); Michael J. Perry, Substantive Due Process 
Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 417 (1976); Jed Rubenfeld, 
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 744–52 (1989). Note that Justice Douglas, in his 
concurring opinion, strongly resisted the idea that the Ninth Amendment grounded any enforceable 
rights, indicating that the implication in Roe rests in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
 131. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 155. This is the case with most constitutional rights: for the Australian 
implied freedom see, for example, the comments in Austl. Cap. Television Pty. Ltd. v Commonwealth 
(1992) 177 CLR 106, 142 (Austl.) (Mason, C.J.), 159 (Brennan, J.), 169 (Deane, J., and Toohey, J.), 
217 (Gaudron, J.), 234 (McHugh, J.); Nationwide News (1992), 177 CLR 1, 76 (Austl.) (Deane, J., and 
Toohey, J.). 
 132. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. On the ―compelling interest‖ test, see, for example, the comments in 
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 223 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 133. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). 
 134. Id. at 157–58. 
 135. Id. at 163.  
 136. Id. 
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B. Interpretive Disagreement 
Roe remains one of the most criticized decisions of the Supreme 
Court,
137
 with the majority justices attacked for both the interpretive 
methodology they employed and the moral consequences of the decision. 
As discussed in this section, three broad categories of interpretive criticism 
were raised against the majority decision in Roe. First, critics argued that 
the implication was not grounded in the interpretive orthodoxy of 
constitutional text and history. Second, that there was a preferable locale, 
either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment, for the 
grounding of the right to an abortion. Third, assuming that the right to an 
abortion was a sound implication to draw from the Constitution, the 
presumption of judicial protection, rather than legislative protection, was 
ill-conceived.
138
 
1. Interpretive Disagreement: Implications and Interpretive Orthodoxy 
The key criticism of the Roe decision is that it is not grounded in 
interpretive orthodoxy. This critique generally manifests in one of three 
forms.  
a. Objection to Implications Generally 
The first form of the disagreement with Roe that relies on interpretive 
orthodoxy is an objection to any theory of implied rights more generally. 
That is, these commentators object not only to the specific implication in 
Roe but also to the more general theory of drawing rights-based 
implications from a written constitution. This objection argues generally 
that the Constitution enumerates a series of rights, and there is no authority 
for judges to stray beyond these expressly articulated rights; to allow this 
would be to ―abandon all hope of limiting judicial power.‖139 This 
 
 
 137. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text; see also, Barry Friedman, Dialogue and 
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 659 (1993). On the backlash created by Roe, see Robert Post 
& Reva Seigel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 
373 (2007). 
 138. Of course, there is significant overlap between these arguments. 
 139. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 381, 386 (1992) (commenting in the context of criticizing this view). An express right 
would, of course, have greater democratic legitimacy. Supporting and opposing this view, see, for 
example, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 523 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Blackman, J., 
and Marshall, J.); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 465 (1983) 
(Connor, J., dissenting, joined by White, J., and Rehnquist, J.). 
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argument considers judge-made law to be constitutionally suspect when it 
has ―little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution‖140 and often relies on the historical distinction between 
America‘s adoption of a written Constitution, in direct contrast to English 
constitutionalism and unwritten law.
141
 For these critics, it is both 
interpretively and democratically objectionable that the judiciary assumes 
responsibility for issues not expressly articulated in the written 
Constitution. 
b. Objections to the Privacy Implication 
The second form of the disagreement with Roe based on interpretive 
orthodoxy, while accepting that rights implications can be drawn from the 
Constitution, is an objection to the implication of privacy from the Due 
Process Clause. This critique of Roe rests on the premise that neither a 
strict textualist reading of the Constitution nor constitutional history 
supports the implication of any general privacy right.
142
 Similar to the first 
form of the argument based on interpretive orthodoxy, the opponents of an 
implied right of privacy contend that ―when the Constitution sought to 
protect private rights it specified them; that it explicitly protects some 
elements of privacy, but not others, suggests that it did not mean to protect 
those not mentioned.‖143 In spite of the weight of precedent,144 the claim is 
that these cases do not establish a general right of privacy, rather, they 
were indicative of specific privacy interests that had secure grounding in 
the constitutional text and history.
145
 
 
 
 140. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
 141. See, e.g., Vanhorne‘s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 308 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (―[I]n 
England there is no written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible, nothing real, nothing 
certain, by which a statute can be tested. In America the case is widely different.‖). See also the 
seminal pronouncement in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring). For 
an excellent outline of written versus unwritten law, both pre- and post-Roe, see Jed Rubenfeld, The 
New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001). 
 142. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stewart, J.), 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 471–72 (1972) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 390 (1997) (Scalia, 
J., concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J.); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 605–06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 143. Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1422 (1974). 
 144. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17 (2000). Although note that the 
Court recently appears to be employing a concept of personal autonomy in preference to privacy. See, 
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 574 (2003); see also, Martin Belsky, Privacy: The 
Rehnquist Court‟s Unmentionable “Right”, 36 TULSA L.J. 43, 58 (2000). 
 145. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 
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c. Objections to the Extension of the Privacy Implication to 
Abortion 
The third form of the orthodox interpretive disagreement with Roe 
argues that while there may in fact be a generalized right of privacy 
emanating from the Constitution, it cannot extend to an implied right to an 
abortion because sexual privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution, nor 
does the constitutional text or history in any form suggest an original 
intent to protect a right to an abortion. These critics draw on the Court‘s 
own supporting argument in Roe, that a right will only be implied if it is 
―so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,‖146 or ―implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,‖147 and 
contend that while this argument can support various other aspects of 
―privacy,‖ it cannot support a right to an abortion. The commentators 
argue that abortion rights are not deeply rooted in the traditions of the 
United States,
148
 as they were not recognized by the drafters of the 
Constitution,
149
 and have been consistently restricted (demonstrating that 
abortion rights are not implicit in the concept of well-ordered liberty),
150
 
notwithstanding the Court‘s questionable historical analysis in Roe.151 One 
 
 
920 (1973). Cf. Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade 
and its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765, 772 (1973) (arguing that the cases establish a sphere of interests 
called privacy, with the core of this sphere being the ―right of the individual to make for himself . . . 
the fundamental decisions that shape family life‖). 
 146. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (cited with approval in Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); 
Kenyon Bunch, If Racial Desegregation, Then Same-Sex Marriage? Originalism and the Supreme 
Court‟s Fourteenth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 781, 836–37 (2005). 
 147. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1934) (cited with approval in Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
 148. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 793 
(1986) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part, 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.). But compare Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727–28 
(1997), where, in order to resist an expansion of the privacy right, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, with what might be considered breath-taking hypocrisy, distinguished 
voluntary euthanasia from ―deeply rooted‖ rights, including abortion. 
 149. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174–77 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id.; see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 793 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). On 
the tradition of regulating abortion, see, for example, Kenyon Bunch, If Racial Desegregation, Then 
Same-Sex Marriage? Originalism and the Supreme Court‟s Fourteenth Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL‘Y 781 (2005). See also early Supreme Court cases upholding laws prohibiting abortion, 
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898), and Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926), and the 
discussion of those cases in Roy Lucas, Forgotten Supreme Court Abortion Cases: Drs. Hawker & 
Hurwitz in the Dock and Defrocked, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 641 (2003). 
 151. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 925 n.42 (1973); Norman Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right of 
Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 873 (1974). 
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particular distinction made is that a right to an abortion is ―inherently 
different‖ from the preceding privacy cases because a ―pregnant woman 
cannot be isolated in her privacy.‖152  
2. Interpretive Disagreement: Locale of the Right 
The second key criticism of the Court‘s decision in Roe is that the 
Court incorrectly based the implied right to an abortion in the Due Process 
Clause‘s concept of privacy, instead of locating it in the arguably more 
secure Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
153
 For these 
critics, giving substantive effect to the ostensibly procedural Due Process 
Clause has always been a contentious exercise for the Court.
154
 Therefore, 
the abortion right would be on a more secure footing if premised instead 
on the textually enshrined constitutional ideal of political equality and full 
citizenship.
155
  
For these critics, it is axiomatic that an abortion right be grounded in 
equal protection jurisprudence: only women become pregnant, and 
therefore only women may need an abortion. Women therefore form a 
discrete class against whom discrimination is perpetuated when the right 
to an abortion is denied, and any denial of an abortion right forces women 
to become involuntary ―incubators‖156 and perpetuates traditional, 
constitutionally barred gender roles.
157
 Anita L. Allen, a leading proponent 
 
 
 152. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). See also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; David Smolin, Fourteenth 
Amendment Unenumerated Rights Jurisprudence: An Essay in Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 815, 830 (2001). 
 153. Note, however, that Ronald Dworkin claims that it is preferable to locate the right in the First 
Amendment Free Exercise and Establishment clauses. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE‘S DOMINION: AN 
ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1994). 
 154. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion 
Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (1973); David Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights 
Jurisprudence: An Essay in Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 815, 818 
(2001). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) 
(―The Judiciary, including this Court is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even 
the design of the Constitution.‖). 
 155. See Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on 
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 419 (1994–1995); Jack M. 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); 
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and 
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
 156. Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (1979). 
 157. See, e.g., CATHERINE MACKINNON, ROE V. WADE: A STUDY IN MALE IDEOLOGY IN 
ABORTION—MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Cass Sunstein, 
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 
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of this argument, claims that ―[a] constitutional jurisprudence of abortion 
that expressly draws on the Fourteenth Amendment‘s language of ‗liberty‘ 
and ‗equal protection‘ would meld with the reality that many of the root 
concerns behind privacy arguments are not different from, or in opposition 
to, the root concerns of the gender equality arguments.‖158 For these 
critics, grounding the implication in the Equal Protection Clause would 
securely situate the abortion right in the text and originalist intent of the 
Constitution and enable the implied right to develop responsively to the 
concern of those who may have the right. 
3. Interpretive Disagreement: Legitimacy and Judicial Overreach 
The third interpretive argument commonly raised by critics of Roe is 
that, even assuming that the Court was justified in implying a right to an 
abortion from the Constitution, the assessment of when that right could be 
overridden should have been left to the state legislatures. The Court in Roe 
specified that for a state to prohibit abortion, it must serve a compelling 
state interest and specified the two interests that it considered would 
satisfy this test: the life of the mother, and the protection of the fetus.
159
  
However, these interests were not compelling over the entirety of the 
pregnancy; rather, the two interests become compelling incrementally. 
Neither interest is compelling in the first trimester, and, therefore, the state 
is unable to proscribe or regulate abortion in the first trimester.
160
 The 
health of the mother becomes compelling in the second trimester.
161
 The 
interest in protecting the fetus becomes compelling only in the third 
trimester, after the fetus reached viability, and, consequently, this interest 
permits a state to generally prohibit third-trimester abortions).
162
 
Underlying the Court‘s trimester approach is the implicit assumption that 
personhood begins at viability, not conception.
163
 
For some critics of Roe, the Court‘s viability and trimester approach 
reads like ―a set of hospital rules and regulations,‖164 and, in essence, is an 
 
 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). 
 158. Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on 
Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY 419, 420 (1994–1995). 
 159. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.  
 160. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 163–64. Note that viability is the point at which the fetus has the capacity to maintain 
life outside the uterus. 
 163. On this point, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rationalizing the Abortion Debate: Legal Rhetoric 
and the Abortion Controversy, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 107, 124–25 (1982). 
 164. ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 
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unprincipled, unjustified, and undemocratic assumption of control over 
what is a legislative decision. The outlining of a ―kind of legislative code 
. . . that will satisfy the Constitution‖165 second-guesses legislative 
balances, and the Court asked ―itself a question the Constitution has not 
made the Court‘s business.‖166 These critics also make the orthodox 
interpretive charge that there was no basis for the trimester test in either 
the text of the U.S. Constitution or its history; thus, the Roe Court assumed 
responsibility for an essentially legislative decision, and, thereby 
overstepped the bounds of democratic legitimacy, as the right to set 
boundaries regarding societal values is a legislative, not a judicial 
function. 
C. Doctrinal Advance and Retreat 
1. Maintaining the Core of Roe in the Face of Disagreement 
Following Roe, a significant number of states rewrote their abortion 
laws, ostensibly to comply with the Court‘s decision. Many cases swiftly 
arose challenging these laws as contradictory to the Court‘s ruling in 
Roe.
167
 From the first post-Roe case of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
168
 
the interpretive disagreement between the justices was apparent, and in 
marked contrast to Australia where even opponents of the implied freedom 
have felt bound to apply Lange,
169
 from its inception the implied abortion 
right has faced enemies within the Supreme Court who have chipped away 
at various aspects of the doctrine.
170
 However, in contrast to the intra-
judicial interpretive disagreement following the initial implication of the 
implied freedom in ACTV, the opposing justices in the immediate post-Roe 
cases did not attack the core of the decision of, either the grounding of the 
implication in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or the 
 
 
(1976). 
 165. Paul A. Freund, Storms over the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1474, 1480 (1983). 
 166. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
943 (1973). 
 167. On this point, see GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 176 (1991). 
 168. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–69 (1976). 
 169. See, e.g., Mulholland v Austl. Electoral Comm‟n (2004) 220 CLR 181, 293 (Callinan, J.). 
Although, note that Justice Callinan‘s approach has been labeled ―temporary acquiescence.‖ Andrew 
Lynch, Dissent: The Rewards and Risks of Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia, 27 
MELB. U. L. REV. 724, 767 n.212 (2003).  
 170. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174–177 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), 207 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of Akron v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983). 
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trimester framework. Rather, the opposing justices held strongly to the 
precise words of the decision in Roe and opposed the application of the 
doctrine to various state abortion-curbing laws. In Danforth, for example, 
while a majority of the Court actively upheld the letter and spirit of the 
Roe doctrine, striking down a Missouri statute that required a woman to 
obtain her husband‘s consent prior to having an abortion,171 the dissenting 
justices argued that even accepting Roe, ―[t]he task of policing [Roe] 
limitation[s] on state police power is and will be a difficult and continuing 
venture in substantive due process,‖172 subsequently holding that 
limitations on abortion do not ―conflict[] with the statement in Roe.‖173  
The dissenter‘s method of attacking the application of Roe rather than 
the core of the doctrine successfully swayed some of the majority in a 
number of cases, including a series of cases upholding restrictions on the 
use of federal funding for abortions
174
 and a number of cases requiring 
parental or judicial consent in the case of minors.
175
 In the face of these 
decisions, the majority took a protective approach to the core of Roe, 
conscious of the continued disagreement both on and off the bench over 
the validity of the initial implication. The upholding of the core can be 
seen in, for example, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health,
176
 where a 6–3 majority struck down a law compelling pre-
abortion counseling, requiring a 24-hour waiting period, and requiring all 
abortions to be performed in a hospital. The majority‘s self-consciousness 
about the initial implication was evident, with the opening page of Justice 
Stewart‘s opinion for the Court specifying that ―arguments continue to be 
made . . . that we erred in interpreting the Constitution . . . . Nonetheless, 
the doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a 
constitutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society 
governed by the rule of law.‖177 That the Court chose to state the 
importance of stare decisis is indicative of both the self-consciousness of 
the justices about the initial implication, as well as the paucity of the 
 
 
 171. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67–69 (1976). In the case of minors, the law required a parent‘s 
consent. Id.; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1979) (holding a similar Massachusetts law 
unconstitutional).  
 172. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 92 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 173. Id.at 89 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 174. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
 175. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).  
 176. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 177. Id. at 419–20. 
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interpretive resources on which the Court had to rely in restating the 
validity of the initial implication.  
A change in Court personnel resulted in heightened interpretive 
disagreement over the implication, and a shift in the nature of the 
argumentation of the dissenters. Rather than simply attacking the 
application of the Roe doctrine, the dissenters began to attack core features 
of the doctrine. Justice O‘Connor, appointed in 1981, wrote the dissenting 
opinion in City of Akron and argued that the ―trimester or ‗three-stage‘ 
approach adopted by the Court in Roe, and, in a modified form, employed 
by the Court to analyze the regulations in these cases, cannot be supported 
as a legitimate or useful framework for accommodating the woman‘s right 
and the State‘s interests.‖178 The dissenters, then, put the majority on 
notice that they were willing to attack at least part of the Roe implication.  
By 1986, a self-conscious Supreme Court began to be swayed by the 
interpretive arguments of the Roe dissenters, and it was only by a narrow 
5–4 majority that the Court invalidated a set of Pennsylvania restrictions 
on access to abortion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists.
179
 Justice Blackmun‘s opinion for the Court strongly 
defended the Roe doctrine and the initial implication, stating that ―the 
constitutional principles that led this Court to its decisions in 1973 still 
provide the compelling reason for recognizing the constitutional 
dimensions of a woman‘s right to decide whether to end her 
pregnancy.‖180 Justice Blackmun further asserted: 
Constitutional rights do not always have easily ascertainable 
boundaries, and controversy over the meaning of our Nation‘s most 
majestic guarantees frequently has been turbulent. As judges, 
however, we are sworn to uphold the law even when its content 
gives rise to bitter dispute . . . . [D]isagreements . . . do not . . . 
relieve us of our duty to apply the Constitution faithfully.
181
 
The dissenters attributed the defensive nature of the majority‘s opinion to 
sensitivity over the inexhaustible criticism over the initial implication: 
The decision today appears symptomatic of the Court‘s own 
insecurity over its handiwork in Roe v. Wade and the cases 
following that decision. Aware that in Roe it essentially created 
 
 
 178. Id. at 453–54 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 179. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 180. Id. at 759.  
 181. Id. at 771–72. 
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something out of nothing and that there are many in this country 
who hold that decision to be basically illegitimate, the Court 
responds defensively. Perceiving, in a statute implementing the 
State‘s legitimate policy of preferring childbirth to abortion, a threat 
to or criticism of the decision in Roe v. Wade, the majority 
indiscriminately strikes down statutory provisions that in no way 
contravene the right recognized in Roe.
182
 
While City of Akron may have put the Roe majority on notice that the 
interpretive attack was about to shift from the application to the core of the 
implication, Thornburgh was the first case in which all dissenters attacked 
the initial implication itself. Chief Justice Burger‘s dissent argued that 
―[t]he soundness of our holdings must be tested by the decisions that 
purport to follow them. If . . . today‘s holding really mean[s] what [it] 
seem[s] to say, I agree we should reexamine Roe.‖183 Similarly, Justices 
White and Rehnquist stated that ―the time has come to recognize that Roe 
v. Wade . . . ‗departs from a proper understanding‘ of the Constitution and 
[should be overruled].‖184 The justices argued that the text of the U.S. 
Constitution contains no reference to abortion, pregnancy, or reproduction 
more generally,
185
 and even if abortion could be considered ―liberty‖ under 
the Due Process Clause, it was not so fundamental that ―restrictions upon 
it call into play anything more than the most minimal judicial scrutiny.‖186 
Justice O‘Connor‘s dissent was equally virulent, focusing on the standard 
of review and the ―outmoded trimester framework‖ established in Roe as 
she did in Akron.
187
 The dissenting justices, then, appeared ready to attack 
both the grounding of the implication on orthodox interpretational 
grounds, as well as the standard of review at the core of the Roe decision. 
2. Doctrinal Retreat: Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
The Roe opponents finally gained an interpretive majority in the 1989 
decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
188
 where a majority 
of justices, while avoiding overruling Roe outright, explicitly rejected the 
applicability of Roe‘s trimester test, which would have dictated the level 
 
 
 182. Id. at 813–14 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). 
 183. Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 788 (White, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 789 (White, J., dissenting). 
 186. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 790 
(1986).(White, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 828 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
 188. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) . 
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of judicial scrutiny and related presumptions of constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality and, instead, adopted Justice O‘Connor‘s ―undue 
burden‖ test. However, disagreement remained amongst the new majority 
as to the validity of the initial implication. Although various justices were 
prepared to overrule Roe,
189
 Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s opinion for the 
Court specified that the facts of Webster differed from Roe such that the 
case ―affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe.‖190 The resulting 
opinions contributed to what was a fractured and jumbled interpretive 
approach, with no common interpretive ground amongst the majority and a 
strong dissent from the minority.
191
  
Although the core implication itself remained,
192
 the Roe doctrine was 
modified, with the Chief Justice in dicta explicitly rejecting the trimester 
framework as ―hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in 
general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as 
ours does.‖193 Rehnquist revisited his dissent in Thornburgh and, relying 
on interpretive orthodoxy, held that the ―key elements of the Roe 
framework—trimesters and viability—are not found in the text of the 
Constitution or in any place else one would expect to find a constitutional 
principle.‖194  
The strong criticism of Roe‟s strict scrutiny standard signaled a 
stronger interpretive disagreement among the justices. Claims that a 
fundamental right has been infringed are always assessed against a strict-
scrutiny standard.
195
 Thus, when the Court‘s rejected of the strict-scrutiny 
standard in the abortion context, it signaled a rejection of the Roe Court‘s 
assessment that the right to an abortion was a fundamental liberty. The 
result of Webster was to both weaken the implication of a right to abortion 
generally, as well as to signal a retreat from the Roe Court‘s more 
expansive interpretive approach to a constitutional jurisprudence less 
reliant on implication and more reliant on constitutional text and history. 
 
 
 189. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 80–81 (2007). 
 190. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (1989) (Opinion of the Court).  
 191. On the fractured nature of the decision, see, for example, A.I.L. Campbell, The Constitution 
and Abortion, 53 MOD. L. REV. 238 (1990); Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the 
Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83 (1989). 
 192. However, note Justice Scalia‘s attack on the implication more generally in his separate 
opinion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532–37 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. at 518 (Opinion of the Court). 
 194. Id.  
 195. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Kramer v. Union Free School 
District, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969); Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
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3. Interpretive Resolution? The Casey Compromise 
As a solution to the interpretive controversy, Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
196
 was a resounding failure. Casey 
involved a Pennsylvania statute that imposed significant restrictions on 
abortions through informed consent, parental consent, spousal notification, 
and record-keeping requirements; importantly, Casey presented the Court 
with an opportunity to directly overrule Roe and clarify the interpretive 
disagreement that had plagued the implied right since its initial 
implication.
197
 The justices originally agreed in conference to overrule Roe 
5–4,198 with Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s draft majority opinion going to the 
core of the interpretive disagreement and expunging the implication of a 
right to an abortion as derived from the implied right of privacy from the 
Constitution. Rehnquist followed his approach in Webster and argued that 
nothing in the text or history of the Constitution indicated that the 
document extended so far.
199
 Justice Blackmun‘s dissent upheld and 
defended Roe in its entirety. 
Three justices were uncomfortable with the approaches of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice Blackman and sought to effectuate a compromise. 
These justices, Justices O‘Connor, Kennedy and Souter, authored a joint 
opinion which declined to overrule Roe, instead upholding the ―central 
right recognized by Roe.‖200 Notwithstanding the noted strength of the 
arguments against the constitutional foundations of the initial 
implication,
201
 the joint opinion held that the principle of stare decisis 
mandated the upholding of the core of the Roe implication.
202
 However, 
the joint opinion attacked the standard of review that Roe had set down as 
constitutionally required, and explicitly abandoned Roe‟s trimester 
framework, claiming it was a rigid, non-essential holding of Roe, and 
instead favoring Justice O‘Connor‘s ―undue burden‖ test.203  
 
 
 196. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 197. Id. at 833, 877. 
 198. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 152–54 (2007). 
 199. Id.  
 200. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (Opinion of the Court). Note that the Bush Administration explicitly 
asked the Court to overturn Roe. On this, and the Administration‘s deliberate attempt to stack the 
Court for this purpose, see generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
 201. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853.  
 202. Id. at 871 (Opinion of the Court) (―[T]he immediate question is not the soundness of Roe‟s 
resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding.‖). 
 203. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
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Despite upholding the core implication of a right to an abortion and the 
broad and sweeping language stating the importance of reproductive 
freedom for women‘s privacy, autonomy, and equality, the joint opinion 
marked a significant retreat from the doctrine set down in Roe. While 
emphasizing the ―essential holding‖ of Roe,204 that the Due Process Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution impliedly protects a woman‘s fundamental right 
to an abortion pre-viability, the joint opinion held that although the state 
cannot proscribe abortion pre-viability, it has a sufficient interest in 
protecting the health of the mother and the potentiality of human life to 
regulate abortion so long as the state does not place an ―undue burden‖ on 
a woman‘s right to an abortion.205 The opinion also reiterated that a state 
may proscribe post-viability abortion completely so long as there is an 
exception for the health of the mother.
206
 Under this ruling, the joint 
opinion upheld all but the spousal notification provisions in the 
Pennsylvania legislation, arguing that only the notification provision was 
an undue burden on a right to an abortion, as it placed a ―substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.‖207 
The Casey decision, then, does not reflect a unified interpretive 
approach. Like the unanimous decision of the High Court in Lange, the 
joint opinion reaffirmed Roe; and like the decision in Lange, the opinion in 
Casey substantially modified, if not weakened, the initial implication of 
the right.
208
 However, unlike Lange, where the reinterpretation of the 
implied freedom was unanimous, in Casey the interpretive disagreement 
among the Supreme Court justices was obvious, and although Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, 
concurred in the core aspects of the joint judgment,
209
 his opinion 
explicitly criticized the initial implication as lacking in orthodox 
 
 
 204. Id. at 833. 
 205. Id. at 878–79. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 878. 
 208. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588, 595 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); see also Martin H. Belsky, Privacy: The Rehnquist Court‟s 
Unmentionable “Right”, 36 TULSA L.J. 43, 47–50 (2000); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking 
Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 676 (2004); Hilary 
Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard in Stenberg v. Carhart: Will Proposed RU-
486 Legislation Survive?, 35 IND. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2002); Jenny R. Kramer, Fourteenth 
Amendment—Due Process—Compliance with Supreme Court Jurisprudence in the Post Roe and 
Casey Era, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 529, 531 (2001); Suzanne E. Skov, Stenberg v. Carhart: The 
Abortion Debate Goes Technical, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 235, 235 (2004). 
 209. That is, the upholding of the various Pennsylvania laws. See Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, J., 
Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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interpretive methodology and stated that on this basis Roe should be 
overturned.
210
 Justices Blackmun and Stevens, while concurring with the 
upholding of the ―essential holding‖ of Roe, dissented from the excising of 
the trimester framework and adoption of the undue burden standard, 
arguing that the new standard was manipulable, thus undermining the need 
for strict scrutiny of the fundamental right to an abortion.
211
 Justice Scalia, 
in a separate opinion, savaged the undue burden test on the same 
interpretive grounds that motivated the joint justices to retreat from the 
trimester framework—that it lacked foundation in the Constitution: ―The 
ultimately standardless nature of the ‗undue burden‘ inquiry is a reflection 
of the underlying fact that the concept has no principled or coherent legal 
basis.‖212 
D. Interpretive Disagreement and Its Consequences Post-Casey
213
 
Although Casey is now widely accepted as authoritative, it remains the 
subject of strong interpretive disagreement.
214
 There is a very real fear that 
new appointees to the Court will facilitate the reconsideration and 
expungement of the Roe implied right entirely.
215
 The Casey compromise 
 
 
 210. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 211. Id. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 914 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 212. Id. at 987 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). For scholarly criticisms of the undue burden standard, see, for example, Caitlin 
E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 675 (2004); Elizabeth A. Cavendish, Casey Reflections, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‘Y & 
L. 305 (2002); Hilary Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard in Stenberg v. 
Carhart: Will Proposed RU-486 Legislation Survive?, 35 IND. L. REV. 1021 (2002); Sabina Zenkich, X 
Marks the Sport While Casey Strikes Out: Two Controversial Abortion Decisions, 23 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 1001 (1993). 
 213. The phrase is not overly dramatic in the context of the debate. See Webster v. Reprod. Health 
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., concurring 
and dissenting in part) (―I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of 
women who have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided. I fear for the integrity 
of, and public esteem for, this Court.‖); Andrew A. Adams, Aborting Roe: Jane Roe Questions the 
Viability of Roe v. Wade, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 325, 329 (2005) (labeling Roe an ―abomination‖); 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 
1001 (2003) (claiming that Casey is ―‗[t]he Worst‘—worse, even, than its nearest rivals, Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, Roe v. Wade, and Stenberg v. Carhart‖). 
 214. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by 
Thomas, J.); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 569 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stenberg, 530 
U.S. 918, 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 980 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 852–53 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., 
concurring). 
 215. See generally JAN CRAWFORD GREENBERG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol11/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2012] IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 135 
 
 
 
 
has failed to act as the interpretive bridge that the joint opinion writers 
envisaged. While the joint opinion managed to prevent reconsideration of 
Roe in the short-term, the attempt to accommodate different interpretive 
views has created an unstable jurisprudence that exposes both Casey and 
Roe to the ongoing danger of reconsideration.  
This situates the implied abortion right jurisprudence in a very different 
position than the Australian implied freedom. Whereas in Australia it is 
the Lange Court‘s unanimous commitment to text and structure and the 
resulting paucity of interpretive resources that has affected the 
development of the implied freedom, in the United States the Casey 
Court‘s lack of commitment to the grounding of the implication as well as 
the self-conscious modifications of the relevant standard of review—
against which restrictive legislation will be judged—has had the 
consequence of fracturing any development of the implied right. 
Continuing doubts over the grounding of the implied right and the 
instability of the protective standard have led to stagnation, manipulation, 
and a fragmented abortion right jurisprudence. 
1. The Continuing Doubt Over the Grounding of the Right and Its 
Consequences 
Although the authors of Casey‘s joint opinion reaffirmed the Roe 
Court‘s holding that the ―liberty‖ in the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Due 
Process Clause was the basis for the implied right, it seriously undermined 
this determination and the consequent security of the right in two ways: by 
over-reliance on stare decisis, and by undergirding the liberty justification 
with an equal protection rationale. 
a. Over-Reliance on Stare Decisis 
First, the joint opinion openly expressed doubts as to how they would 
have decided the issue de novo, stating that it was only the added force of 
the doctrine of stare decisis and a need for institutional integrity that 
compelled the Court to uphold the implication from the Due Process 
Clause.
216
 The concern, of course, is that the three determinative justices in 
Casey did not state whether, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, 
 
 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2007). 
 216. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) 
(Opinion of the Court) (―Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution 
requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.‖). 
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Roe was correct or incorrect as a matter of principle. This uncritical 
adherence to precedent highlights the doubts over the textual and historical 
foundations of the implied right, and, consequently, results in a dearth of 
interpretive resources by which the right can be developed in subsequent 
cases. With no interpretive ―touchstone‖ to refer to, the right necessarily 
becomes stagnant and, indeed, manipulable to each individual justice‘s 
predilections as to the appropriate grounding of the implication. Further, 
the stare decisis rationale has left the Court open to the criticism that it has 
threatened its own legitimacy by failing to carefully consider a matter that 
is practically impossible to remedy through legislative action.
217
  
b. Equal Protection Rationale 
Second, although recognizing that the right is derived from the 
―liberty‖ of the Due Process Clause, the Court referred specifically to the 
effect of abortion laws on the status of women, arguing that, ―[a]n entire 
generation has come of age free to assume Roe‟s concept of liberty in 
defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive 
decisions.‖218 As David Strauss has argued, the joint opinion, as well as 
the separate opinions of Justices Stevens and Blackmun, referred to the 
status of women as a justification for the perpetuation of the right to an 
abortion.
219
 That is, while the justices specified that the implication was 
grounded in individual liberty and reproductive autonomy (i.e. the Due 
Process Clause), their rationale (albeit unformed and unclear) for the 
implication was a concern for the position of women and a concern that 
the political process would subordinate women (i.e., Equal Protection 
Clause concerns). As with the reliance on stare decisis, the unprincipled 
and unjustified rationalization for upholding the initial implication leaves 
the implication, in its current form, subject to judicial manipulation and 
peculiarly vulnerable to reconsideration; it is simply not possible for the 
right to develop coherently while its underlying raison d‟etre is 
consistently undermined and challenged. 
 
 
 217. An additional point could be made that in the context of the Supreme Court‘s history of 
overruling key constitutional doctrines, the stare decisis argument is disingenuous. See, e.g., Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).  
 218. Referred to in David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 3 (1992). 
 219. Id. at 1–3; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 (Opinion of the Court); id. 926–28 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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c. Consequences 
The consequence of the Casey Court‘s inability to clearly affirm the 
liberty grounding of the implied right or to clearly re-situate the right in 
the Equal Protection Clause has left the right stagnant and susceptible to 
manipulation. Without a firm grounding, defenders of the right to an 
abortion are naturally self-conscious about the basis of the right, and they 
are left defending the initial implication by whatever means they can. This 
makes it impossible for the right to cultivate the clear and developed 
jurisprudence necessary to respond to various claims of 
unconstitutionality. Further, opponents of the abortion right are able to 
constantly question and reassess the basis for the implication, thereby 
preventing any significant permanent development in the abortion 
jurisprudence more generally. 
This tension is evident in the two key post-Casey cases of Stenberg v. 
Carhart
220
 and Gonzales v. Carhart,
221
 where the intra-Court dispute as to 
the foundation of the implied right continued. In Stenberg, for example, 
while the majority opinion of Justice Breyer specified that the Court would 
not revisit the legal principles establishing the implied right set down in 
Casey, Justice Kennedy‘s dissenting opinion implicitly attacked the basis 
of the right. Justice Kennedy, who co-authored the joint opinion in Casey, 
stated: 
When the Court reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe, a central 
premise was that the States retain a critical and legitimate role in 
legislating on the subject of abortion . . . . The political processes of 
the State are not to be foreclosed from enacting laws to promote the 
life of the unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its 
potential.
222
  
For Justice Kennedy, while there may exist a right to an abortion in the 
Constitution, it appears that he does not consider that right to be 
fundamental in the sense of other rights derived from the ―liberty‖ of the 
Due Process Clause. The unsettled nature of the initial implied right has 
enabled Justice Kennedy and the other dissenting justices to continue to 
challenge the very existence of the right, rather than simply challenging 
the application of the right to specific circumstances. The Roe opponents 
in Stenberg thus avoided dissent on questions of application, and thereby 
 
 
 220. Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 221. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 222. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 956–57 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). 
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forced a subsequent defense of the implication in Roe by those justices 
supporting the implication. The anti-Roe justices in Stenberg also avoided 
doctrinal discussions that could have been employed in later cases to 
develop the right itself. 
The interpretive tension over the grounding of the implied right was 
also noticeable in Gonzales, where the minority opinion of Justice 
Ginsburg was highly responsive to claims that the implication was 
contrary to interpretive orthodoxy. Noting the general uncertainty over the 
continued existence of the implied right to abortion, ―Casey‘s principles, 
confirming the continuing vitality of the ‗essential holding of Roe,‘ are 
merely ‗assume[d]‘ for the moment . . . rather than ‗retained‘ or 
‗reaffirmed,‘‖223 Justice Ginsburg proceeded to defend the constitutional 
right to an abortion. However, Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent departed from 
the traditional ―liberty‖ defense of the implication and instead seemed to 
reinterpret the basis for the implication on an equal protection footing. She 
stated, picking up on the comments in Casey, that the implied right was 
not founded in ―some generalized notion of privacy; rather [it] center[s] on 
a woman‘s autonomy to determine her life‘s course, and thus to enjoy 
equal citizenship stature.‖224 Ginsburg, then, is seemingly recasting the 
basis for the implication in the hope of finding a more secure locale for the 
right to an abortion.  
The Casey joint opinion argued that ―[l]iberty finds no refuge in a 
jurisprudence of doubt,‖225 yet the ―compromise‖ of relying on precedent 
rather than reaffirming the basis for the implied right by principled 
argument has simply perpetuated doubts over the grounding of the 
implication. No constitutional doctrine can develop consistently when 
faced with continuous doubts over its existence and validity. Not only are 
supporting justices continually forced to opine in a protectionist manner, 
but the doubts leave supporting justices self-conscious about developing 
the doctrine by reference to the rationale of the initial implication. The 
result is a lack of interpretive resources to which justices may refer in 
developing the right in response to the particular case before them. The 
reliance on stare decisis in Casey only served to heighten and perpetuate 
these difficulties. While the focus remains on the basis of the implication, 
the right itself can never develop in a coherent and consistent manner. 
 
 
 223. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 224. Id. at 172. 
 225. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
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2. The Protective Framework and Standards of Review: Uncertainty 
and Outcomes 
The protective frame of the implied right to an abortion has been 
continuously and consistently attacked and revised. The uncertainty 
surrounding both the applicable standard of review, as well as the 
identification of viability as the crucial point by which to measure 
acceptable state regulation, has had serious consequences for the 
development of the implied right. 
a. The Undue Burden Test 
A fundamental difficulty with the implied abortion right is the lack of 
textual context or traditional understandings to which the Court can refer 
in developing the protective framework of the right. Indeed, one of the 
most problematic aspects of the Roe decision was the establishment of the 
trimester framework—depending upon the stage of the pregnancy—as the 
determining factor in analyzing the level of permissible regulation of the 
abortion right.
226
 Not only had the trimester framework faced strong 
interpretive criticism that it was quasi-legislative and unrooted in the text 
or historical foundations of the Constitution, it had also proved 
unsatisfactory in practice and was never consistently applied.
227
 
The Casey joint opinion sought to respond to these interpretive 
criticisms by substituting an ―undue burden‖ standard of review for the 
trimester-based strict scrutiny standard of set forth in Roe.
228
 The Casey 
joint opinion argued that Roe‟s trimester framework had ―misconceive[d] 
the nature of the pregnant woman‘s interest‖ pre-viability by construing 
the right as too absolute.
229
 Despite Justice O‘Connor‘s pre-Casey 
argument that the undue burden test should apply throughout the entirety 
of the pregnancy,
230
 the Casey joint opinion held that the standard would 
 
 
 226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (Opinion of the Court). On the problems created 
by the trimester framework, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 845 (Opinion of the Court). 
 227. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
joined by White, J., and Kennedy, J.); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 
416, 459 (1983) (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (claiming that the trimester framework has ―no justification 
in law or logic‖); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381–82 (1985). 
 228. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872–75, 878 (Opinion of the Court); cf. id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring 
and dissenting in part). 
 229. Id. at 873; see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 682 (2004). 
 230. See City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 452 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting). 
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apply only to regulations restricting abortions pre-viability; post-viability 
the state could regulate to proscribe abortion completely.
231
 
As to where the ―undue burden‖ test derived from and how it would 
apply, the joint justices offered no guidance, stating only that ―[n]ot all 
government intrusion is of necessity unwarranted‖232 and that only where 
the state regulation ―has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus‖ 
is there an undue burden on the right to an abortion.
233
 The only 
elucidation of the joint opinion on what a ―substantial obstacle‖ is was 
itself uninformative: ―In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an 
unconstitutional burden.‖234  
While the doctrinal shift to an undue burden test was intended to be 
responsive to orthodox interpretive critiques of the trimester framework, 
the new undue burden standard has itself been criticized as lacking a 
constitutional foundation, and for the difficulty of its application-in-fact.
235
 
In a vicious attack on the undue burden standard, Justice Scalia charged 
that the standard was a ―verbal shell game [to] conceal raw judicial policy 
choices,‖236 and that it is ―inherently manipulable and will prove 
hopelessly unworkable in practice.‖237 Chief Justice Rehnquist ominously 
warned that ―it is a standard which is not built to last.‖238 The same 
orthodox interpretive concerns that led to the overturning of the trimester 
framework, then, are equally applicable to the undue burden standard. 
The undue burden test is as equally ungrounded in text or history as 
was the trimester framework and, since Casey, has itself faced criticism 
for its lack of content. The consequences for the doctrinal development of 
 
 
 231. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860, 870–71; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 784 
(1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). There was some authority for this apparently novel 
test; see, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1997) (Opinion of the Court); id. at 489 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J., and Marshall, J.); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 640, 648 
(1979). 
 232. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875 (1992). 
 233. Id. at 877.  
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. at 964–65 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part, joined by White, J., Scalia, 
J. and Thomas, J.); id. at 985–93 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, 
C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights 
After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 687–89 (2004). Some of these criticisms appear 
to have been borne out. See Women‘s Med. Prof‘l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 218–19 (6th Cir. 
1997) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Hilary Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard in 
Stenberg v. Carhart: Will Proposed RU-486 Legislation Survive?, 35 IND. L. REV. 1021, 1021 (2002). 
 236. Casey, 505 U.S. at 987 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 237. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 986 (1992) 
 238. Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part, joined by White, J., Scalia, J., 
and Thomas, J.). 
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the implied right have been significant. With an unclear and ungrounded 
standard of review, it is not plausible that a consistent jurisprudence will 
emerge from the Court. Furthermore, the manipulability of the standard 
opens the Court to criticism that the implied right is or is not applied in 
accordance with the moral preferences of the justices, rather than well-
reasoned and well-grounded doctrine. The vulnerability of the standard is 
particularly visible in the decisions of Stenberg and Gonzales. 
 i. Stenberg v. Carhart  
In Stenberg,
239
 a majority of justices criticized the undue burden 
standard, although no alternative standard of review emerged.
240
 Further, 
the justices‘ application, and indeed modification, of the Casey standard 
indicates the incredible malleability of the undue burden test. Without any 
rationalization, the majority stated that a Nebraska law banning partial 
birth abortions constituted an undue burden on the right to an abortion 
because it did not contain an exception for the health of the mother.
241
  
The application of a health exception requirement to pre-viability 
regulation represents a significant development on Casey, which did not 
impose a health exception requirement pre-viability even though it 
required such an exception in post-viability cases.
242
 By crafting an 
exception to the Casey rule, the Court has essentially modified the undue 
burden standard, giving itself considerably more scope to strike down 
regulations than under an unadulterated undue burden standard.
243
 
However, the majority failed to acknowledge that their reasoning 
represents even an evolution of Casey, instead preferring to maintain that a 
pre-viability health exception is implicit within the Casey decision.
244
 
 
 
 239. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 240. See, e.g., Hilary Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard in Stenberg v. 
Carhart: Will Proposed RU-486 Legislation Survive?, 35 IND. L. REV. 1021, 1033–34 (2002). 
 241. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937–38 (Opinion of the Court); id. at 950 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). 
This was a relatively uncontroversial holding. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976). 
 242. There may be a limited suggestion in Casey that the health exception applies prior to 
viability, but the point is not decided. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992) (O‘Connor, J., Kennedy, J., 
and Souter, J.); cf. Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, 1011–13 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.). For additional commentary, see also Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter 
Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and Carhart, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 700 
(2004); Hilary Guenther, The Development of the Undue Burden Standard in Stenberg v. Carhart: Will 
Proposed RU-486 Legislation Survive?, 35 IND. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2002). 
 243. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1011 n.20 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and 
Scalia, J.); see also Aimee Gauthier, Stenberg v. Carhart: Have the States Lost Their Power to 
Regulate Abortion?, 36 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 625, 666 (2002). 
 244. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930. 
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Made up of supporters of a woman‘s right to an abortion, the majority in 
Stenberg took a protective approach. Unable to openly question the basis 
of the judgment they sought to transform, the justices instead manipulated 
the standard of review, thereby impeding any principled development of 
the implied right. 
 ii. Gonzales v. Carhart 
In the latest abortion decision, the Court appears to have retreated not 
only from the Stenberg expansion of Casey but also from the standard 
outlined in Casey itself. Although the Court purported to apply the undue 
burden standard, the standard of review for abortion restrictions appears to 
have been demoted from the highest level of review, the strict scrutiny 
standard to the lowest level of review, the rational basis test, without any 
explanation or explication of rationale. The majority opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy stated that ―[w]here [the state] has a rational basis to act, 
and it does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory 
power to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of 
its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession.‖245 In applying 
the newly demoted standard to Nebraska‘s prohibition of partial birth 
abortions, the Court asserted: 
Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks, 
are within the legislative competence when the regulation is 
rational and in pursuit of legitimate ends. When standard medical 
options are available, mere convenience does not suffice to displace 
them; and if some procedures have different risks than others, it 
does not follow that the State is altogether barred from imposing 
reasonable regulations.
246
 
The protective frame of the abortion right, then, has significantly 
contracted under the undue burden standard, which purported to act as a 
strict scrutiny standard. Justice Scalia‘s warning in Casey has proved 
correct: the failure of the joint opinion in Casey to ground the framework 
of the right in the constitutional text or history has resulted in a test that is 
both manipulable and unprincipled. The lack of interpretive resources 
guiding the development of the undue burden standard has meant that 
application of the test to specific abortion prohibitions has been patchy and 
inconsistent. As noted above, this was the critique leveled at the Roe 
 
 
 245. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007) (Opinion of the Court) (emphasis added). 
 246. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). 
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majority‘s trimester framework. However, the consequences for the 
implied right have proven significantly more dire for the rights-holders 
than under the trimester framework: the right to an abortion has shifted 
from a fundamental right accorded strict scrutiny, to one that may be 
regulated with little constitutional restriction. 
b. Viability  
In addition to the instability inherent in the undue burden test, the 
Casey compromise, and consequently the implied right itself, appears 
shaky as a result of the joint opinion establishing viability as the ―critical 
fact.‖247 The most destabilizing element of viability is the lack of a strong 
legal justification for nominating it as the point at which the state may 
restrict access to abortion.
248
 A potential life is no more or less potential on 
either side of viability, yet the Court maintains that the state‘s interest is 
controlled by that distinction.
249
 As the Court has noted, ―legislatures may 
draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a 
justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw.‖250 
Viability cannot, of course, be justified by reference to constitutional 
terms or traditions.
251
 Indeed, the only justification for making this 
division that the Court has advanced is the somewhat tautological 
observation that viability marks ―the time at which there is a realistic 
possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.‖252  
 
 
 247. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836, 860 (1992); 
see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 784 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 
 248. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 794 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.); Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 n.5 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., and Thomas, J.). For a 
suggestion that Justice Blackmun regarded viability as an arbitrary point while drafting the Roe 
opinion, see, for example, Roy Lucas, Forgotten Supreme Court Abortion Cases: Drs. Hawker & 
Hurwitz in the Dock and Defrocked, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 641, 665 (2003). 
 249. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) 
(O‘Connor, J., dissenting, joined by White, J., and Rehnquist, J.). See also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 
795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). 
 250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
 251. If any such point was traditionally recognized, it was ―quickening.‖ See Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 132–39 (1973). 
 252. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (Opinion of the Court); id. at 929–30 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
and dissenting in part); see also Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). For criticism of the failure to 
adequately justify the division, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 159 (1982), and John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924 (1973). Note that the joint opinion did advance a rather unconvincing 
secondary justification for retaining viability, stating that ―there is no line other than viability which is 
more workable.‖ Casey, 505 U.S. at 870. 
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Moreover, the Court has always recognized that viability is difficult to 
determine and incapable of rigid definition.
253
 However, it held in Casey 
that ―[l]iberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear.‖254 
The Court has also acknowledged that improvements in technology will 
continue to shrink the period between conception and viability, though it 
maintains that this will not affect its reasoning.
255
 It is questionable 
whether this prediction is correct: just how much can the window during 
which a woman is free to obtain an abortion shrink before the right 
becomes meaningless?
256
  
Without a convincing justification, without the possibility of definitive 
determination, and without any hope that it will cease its corrosive march 
towards the moment of conception, viability will inevitably need to be 
reconsidered by the Court.
257
 That reconsideration, or its avoidance, 
cannot but significantly destabilize the development of a coherent and 
comprehensive abortion rights jurisprudence. 
E. Preliminary Conclusions 
Judicial self-consciousness has pervaded the development of the 
abortion right implied by Roe, most specifically in the attempt in Casey to 
restrict the protection of the right and thereby head-off the incessant 
criticism of the initial implication. The consequences of this disagreement-
response cycle have been significant. With respect to the abortion 
jurisprudence itself, the instincts of Roe supporters have led them to 
support more protective views of the implied right, for example, regarding 
parental notice and consent.
258
 The problem is, of course, that with the 
supporters of an abortion right so focused on retaining and defending the 
right to an abortion, there is little scope for the development of a coherent 
jurisprudence, and there is a tendency for the supporters to be hostile to 
 
 
 253. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U.S. 379, 387–88 (1979); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519–20 (Renhquist, 
C.J., joined by White, J., and Kennedy, J.); id. at 525 (O‘Connor, J.); see also Bruce Ching, Inverting 
the Viability Test for Abortion Law, 22 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 37, 44 (2000). 
 254. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992). 
 255. Id. at 860; see also Bruce Ching, Inverting the Viability Test for Abortion Law, 22 WOMEN‘S 
RTS. L. REP. 37, 41 (2000). 
 256. Certainly, the following passage would need to be reconsidered: ―The viability line also has, 
as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who 
fails to act before viability has consented to the State‘s intervention on behalf of the developing child.‖ 
Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (Opinion of the Court). 
 257. Bruce Ching, Inverting the Viability Test for Abortion Law, 22 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 37, 45 
(2000). 
 258. See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.  
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any state regulation. Justice White described this phenomenon in 
Thornburgh, where he stated: 
The decision today appears symptomatic of the Court‘s own 
insecurity over its handiwork in Roe v. Wade and the cases 
following that decision. Aware that in Roe it essentially created 
something out of nothing and that there are many in this country 
who hold that decision to be basically illegitimate, the Court 
responds defensively. Perceiving, in a statute implementing the 
State‘s legitimate policy of preferring childbirth to abortion, a threat 
to or criticism of the decision in Roe v. Wade, the majority 
indiscriminately strikes down statutory provisions that in no way 
contravene the right recognized in Roe.
259
 
That this phenomenon is linked to the defense of Roe is evidenced by the 
fact that when the abortion right itself has not been threatened, the Roe 
supporters on the Court have been willing to uphold, for example, laws 
regarding fetuses as persons and fetal murder.
260
 The joint opinion in 
Casey noted that the Court‘s expansive defense of the initial implication 
has actually served the contradictory purpose of casting doubt over Roe.
261
 
However, the justices‘ approach in the joint opinion to the interpretive 
disagreement surrounding Roe was not the same as that of the High Court 
in Lange, where the grounding of the right was recast on a more secure 
doctrinal footing. The joint justices in Casey sought to protect the initial 
implication by narrowing the potential application of the right to various 
state regulations of abortion. That is, by increasing the scope of potential 
state interests, the Casey joint justices were acting to protect the heart of 
the implied right of abortion itself. The protective compromise, however, 
has backfired; whether consciously or not, the modified standard of review 
has proved malleable and weak, and it has enabled anti-Roe justices to 
whittle down the right from something fundamental to something less. So 
long as the interpretive disagreement continues, affording justices from 
both sides the opportunity to attack doctrinal developments, the implied 
right will never develop a sustainable or coherent jurisprudence. 
 
 
 259. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 813–14 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). 
 260. See Richard Stith, Location and Life: How Stenberg v. Carhart Undercut Roe v. Wade, 9 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 255, 265–66 (2003). 
 261. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992) 
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IV. DOCTRINAL CONSEQUENCES AND BROADER RAMIFICATIONS  
A. Linking Consequences to Implications 
This Article demonstrates that the development of both the U.S. 
implied right to an abortion and the Australian implied freedom of 
political communication have been adversely affected by the interpretive 
controversy surrounding their initial implication. Of course, controversy 
accompanies judicial determination of the limits of any rights; indeed, 
controversy is inherent within the nature of rights themselves whether 
express or implied. One could argue that, contrary to the analysis in this 
Article, implied rights are no more peculiarly vulnerable to interpretive 
disagreement and the subsequent doctrinal consequences than express 
rights.  
Even if it were empirically possible to test such an argument, the 
relative intensity of the disagreement is far less important for the argument 
in this Article than the effects of that disagreement. Implied rights do 
suffer from unique problems that demonstrably stem from their origins as 
implications, and any interpretation of implied rights is likely to be 
vulnerable to revisions simply because various aspects of text, context, 
and historical understanding will be advanced as reason to doubt that 
interpretation.
262
 As a result, there will always exist a certain self-
consciousness about the vulnerability of the initial implication and the 
existence of the right. And, at least in the context of the implied abortion 
right and implied freedom, which both have doubtful textual and historical 
origins, a paucity of interpretive resources are available to guide the 
development of a given implication. It is these factors, which are unique to 
implied rights, that combine to affect the development of implied rights. 
1. Judicial Self-Consciousness 
In both the United States and Australia, judicial self-consciousness 
about the initial implication has had significant consequences for the 
development of the implied right and implied freedom respectively. In 
Australia, the High Court‘s initial implication from broad concepts, 
unrooted in the text or the traditional history of the framer‘s intent, 
received scathing criticism from within the Court itself and from 
commentators. In a direct response to these criticisms, the Court 
reformulated the basis of the implied freedom, anchoring it in the text and 
 
 
 262. See generally Stone, Interpretive Disagreement, supra note 15, at 44 (2005). 
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structure of the Constitution, and thereby bringing it within more 
traditionally accepted methods of constitutional argument. However, while 
text and structure have acted as a clear interpretive solution for the 
grounding of the implication, judicial self-consciousness still pervades the 
High Court when interpreting the implied freedom. As a consequence of 
the interpretive disagreement over the initial implication, the justices are 
reluctant to move beyond the confines of the text and employ extra-
constitutional ideas and values necessary to develop various aspects of the 
implied freedom, such as the coverage of ―political communication‖ and 
the relevant standard of review. 
In the United States, judicial self-consciousness in the Supreme Court 
has manifested in a very different manner, although with equally 
significant consequences for the development of the implied right to 
abortion. Following the interpretive disagreement to the initial implication, 
rather than developing a unified response either reinforcing the Due 
Process Clause grounding of the implication or reformulating the basis of 
the implication in the Equal Protection Clause, the Court fractured. The 
proponents of the implication aggressively protected and, where possible, 
expanded the scope of the right. The critics, however, responded by 
attacking, first the application of the right, and subsequently, core aspects 
of the implication itself. Self-consciousness prompted the attempted 
interpretive resolution in Casey; however, the resolution itself was fraught 
with the same difficulties as the initial implication, that is the failure to 
ground the right and the protective frame in text and history. 
Consequently, in both jurisdictions, the Australian High Court and U.S. 
Supreme Court were driven to respond to the interpretive disagreement 
over the initial implication. However, neither court has successfully 
answered the most significant arguments against the initial implication—
that the implications cannot be sufficiently grounded in the text, context, 
or orthodox historical understanding so as to alleviate the disagreement as 
to the existence of the implied rights. These arguments are perpetual, and 
suggest that implied rights will always be accompanied by unresolved 
disagreement over their existence. Because of the inevitable self-
consciousness over disagreement as to implied rights, one preliminary 
conclusion is that implications are an especially weak form of rights 
protection, as it appears the judiciary can never fully disengage from the 
initial interpretive controversy, which necessarily stagnates the 
development of the right itself. This is so whether the implication survives 
subsequent judicial scrutiny by a bare majority, as in Casey, or has 
unanimous support, as in Lange. 
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2. Paucity of Interpretive Resources 
In addition to judicial self-consciousness, the development of implied 
rights are hindered by a paucity of accepted interpretive resources by 
which developments may be supported. This is evident in both 
jurisdictions. In the United States, the Supreme Court has developed and 
modified key elements of the implied right, such as viability, standards of 
review, the health exception, without ever linking those factors to the 
initial implication or to any text or history undergirding the initial 
implication. Conscious of avoiding any reconsideration of the initial 
implication, and aware that the implication itself is open to attack on 
orthodox interpretive grounds, the Court has simply avoided any 
significant delineation of the interpretive methodology employed to 
develop the implied right.  
Similarly, in Australia, although the High Court has clearly located the 
implied freedom in the text of the Australian Constitution, the unrelenting 
adherence to text alone has deprived the Court of the interpretive tools 
necessary to develop the implied freedom in a clear and principled 
manner. While interpretations of the Australian Constitution will be most 
secure when supported by textual provisions, text alone is an insecure 
basis for the recognition and development of a constitutional right. In 
short, whether the implication is located in the text or in the ether, the lack 
of interpretive resources to which the courts can refer necessarily impedes 
any coherent development of implied rights, resulting in a manipulable, 
unprincipled, and fragmented jurisprudence. 
B. Broader Ramifications 
Following ACTV, some commentators anticipated that implied 
constitutional rights would give Australia ―everything a written Bill of 
Rights could give us.‖263 The argument was that implied constitutional 
rights not only acted as an effective substitute for express constitutional 
rights but also were preferable to express rights because implied rights 
would be unlimited by text,
264
 and therefore any debate over rights would 
focus on the substantive values of the right rather than the technical 
meaning of the words.
265
 The failure of these arguments as a matter of 
 
 
 263. Michael Detmold, The New Constitutional Law, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 228, 248 (1994). 
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prediction is indicative of the deeper problem of interpretive disagreement 
more generally.  
Implications are, and will continue to be, an especially weak form of 
rights protection because, as outlined above,
266
 there will always be 
significant interpretive arguments that count against any implication. That 
is, it is the contested nature of constitutional interpretation itself that fuels 
the disagreement about implied rights, and the unrelenting doubts over the 
textual and historical foundations of the implications will inevitably have a 
continuing effect on the content of the rights, and, subsequently, on the 
effectiveness of the right as a protective mechanism. The history of both 
the implied freedom of political communication and the implied abortion 
right demonstrates that the post-implication interpretive disagreement has 
peculiarly significant effects on the content of and protection afforded by 
the right, suggesting that where the existence of a right is subject to attack, 
that right will inevitably be a weak form of rights protection. This at least 
suggests that these rights-distortions are a factor that should be considered 
when assessing the utility of implied rights as a means of protecting 
fundamental values. 
CONCLUSION 
In arguing that interpretive disagreement has significant doctrinal 
consequences for implied fundamental rights, this Article has sought to 
contribute to the ongoing debate across constitutional democracies as to 
how fundamental rights are best protected. In this context, the significant 
disadvantage of reliance on implied rights is that rights implications will 
generally rest upon contested methods of constitutional interpretation, 
either generally or specifically in application. Both the Australian implied 
freedom of political communication and the U.S. implied abortion right 
demonstrate that the subsequent debate over the implication itself, the 
consequent judicial self-consciousness over that initial implication, and the 
paucity of interpretive resources with which doctrinal developments could 
be supported, have an adverse effect on the development of implied rights. 
In both jurisdictions, despite different judicial reactions to the initial 
interpretive controversy, the jurisprudence that has emerged from the 
implied right and freedom has been manipulable, unprincipled and 
fragmented.  
 
 
which ―in some cases, forces us to blur the focus and talk evasively‖). 
 266. See supra notes 24–56 and 139–80 and accompanying text.  
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As a matter of constitutional theory, whether the demonstrated 
weakness of implied rights is undesirable is only a concern if stronger 
constitutional rights are preferred. In Australia, where the culture of rights 
is especially weak, it may be that this form of rights protection is 
acceptable. However, in the strongly rights-protective culture of the 
United States, it may be that modifications need to be made to 
assumptions about the effectiveness of implied rights as a form of strong 
rights protection specifically, and the viability of pursuing rights 
protection through interpretive devices and judicially created rules more 
generally. 
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